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INTRODUCTION
The agreement reached between the Palestinians and Israel, with the
assistance of the United States, at Wye Mills, Maryland on October 23,
1998' ended the ominous stalemate in the peace process. The Wye
1 Wye River Memorandum, Oct. 23, 1998, Isr.-PLO, 37 I.L.M. 1251.
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Memorandum moved the peace process into a new phase, filled with new
hope and old uncertainties.2 Violence and protest after the signing of the
Wye Memorandum mean that this breakthrough has not brought peace to
the Palestinian-Israeli relationship Many concerns about the peace
process still exist.
While fears about the peace process range across a wide variety of
problems from settlements to security, the continued lack of economic
development in the West Bank and Gaza (the Palestinian Territories)
adds to those fears over the health of the peace process. The Wye Memo-
randum, for example, contains provisions that recognize the importance
of Palestinian economic development to the peace process.' The lack of
Palestinian economic development is not a new concern. The continued
economic problems and suffering of the Palestinian people, however,
constitute a threat to building a stable relationship between the Palestini-
ans and Israel. One important aspect of the economic dilemmas facing
the Palestinians is the lack of significant foreign investment in the Pales-
tinian Territories. Foreign investment has long been considered central to
the economic strategy constructed in the Oslo agreements to give Pales-
tinians economic opportunity. In April 1998, the Palestinian National
Authority (PNA) passed a revised Law on the Encouragement of Invest-
ment in Palestine (Revised Investment Law) to strengthen the legal
framework for foreign investment in the Palestinian Territories.' This
law took effect in May of that same year.
2 See AMERICANS FOR PEACE Now, UNDERSTANDING THE WYE MEMORANDUM 1
(1998) ("The Wye Memorandum has given new hope for the eventual success of the
Oslo negotiations.").
3 See Deborah Sontag, A Jew, Then an Arab, Killed in the West Bank, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 27, 1998, at A14 (reporting on the murder of an Israeli and an Arab in the wake
of the Wye Memorandum); Deborah Sontag, Israeli Jeep Blocks a Bomber from
School Bus Carrying 40, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1998, at Al (reporting on the failed
attempt of a Palestinian suicide bomber to destroy a school bus carrying Israeli chil-
dren).
4 Wye River Memorandum, supra note 1, art. H.
- LAW ON THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF INVESTMENT IN PALESTINE, No. 28 (1998) (Pal-
estine), translated by the Palestinian National Authority Ministry of Economy and
Trade, [hereinafter REVISED INVESTMENT LAW]. The official English translation of the
Revised Investment law is reprinted in the Appendix to this issue of the Case Western
Reserve Journal of International Law. 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 521 (1999). The
official translation of the Revised Investment Law is in many places awkward or not
clear. I have made, therefore, some minor grammatical, stylistic, and organizational
changes to improve the readability of the Appendix. I made no changes that would
affect the substance or meaning of the Revised Investment Law.
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This Article analyzes the Revised Investment Law and whether it
enhances the prospects for foreign investment in the Palestinian Territo-
ries. Part I examines the economic development framework established
by 'the Oslo peace agreements and the breakdown of the Oslo strategy for
Palestinian economic development. Part II provides a brief history of the
Palestinian investment law. Part III analyzes and compares the official
English translation of the Revised Investment Law to standards on the
treatment of foreign investment found in international documents and
treaties. Part III also discusses whether the Revised Investment Law con-
forms with international standards on foreign investment. Part IV re-
flects on possible interpretations for the Revised Investment Law's di-
vergence from international standards on foreign investment. Part V of-
fers a few thoughts on the serious problems confronting Palestinian eco-
nomic development in the near and medium-term future. This Article
concludes that, while the Revised Investment Law constitutes a question-
able contribution to Palestinian economic development, greater political,
legal, economic, and philosophical forces will ultimately determine what
contribution the Revised Investment Law makes to the peace process and
the future of the Palestinian people.
I. THE PEACE PROCESS AND PALESTINIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
A. The Oslo Strategy for Palestinian Economic Development
Central to the strategy of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has
been the belief that peace depends on Palestinian economic development.6
As a result, the economic conditions in the Palestinian Territories have
long been an important consideration.7 The importance of Palestinian
6 See David P. Fidler, Foreign Private Investment in Palestine: An Analysis of the
Law on the Encouragement of Investment in Palestine, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 529,
531 (1995) (noting that "[m]any believe that Palestinians who see no improvement in
their standard of living or find no economic opportunities as a result of the peace
process will question the wisdom of making deals with Israel and perhaps support
forces that oppose the peace process"); Odin K. Knudsen, Beyond the Israeli Elec-
tion: Bringing Forth a Sustainable Palestinian Economy, PALESTINE ECON. PULSE,
May-June 1996, at 21 (Mr. Knudsen was a former Resident Representative in World
Bank's West Bank and Gaza Resident Mission arguing that without economic devel-
opment "the Palestinians will become more impoverished, breeding more resentment
and hostility towards Israel").
7 See, e.g., 1-6 World Bank, Developing the Occupied Territories: An Investment
in Peace (1993); Economist Intelligence Unit, Peace Media 1994: Economic Dimen-
sions of the Middle East Peace Process (visited Mar. 15, 1999)
<http://www.palecon.orglpeacedir/peacemedia94/index.html>. See also World Bank,
West Bank and Gaza Update (visited Sept. 9, 1998) <http://www.
[Vol. 31:293
1999] THE REVISED PALESTINIAN INVESTMENT LAW 297
economic development "explains why experts analyzing the current state
of the Palestinian economy are worried about the prospects for the peace
process."' Those crafting the peace process constructed a specific strat-
egy for Palestinian economic development to ensure that peace included
economic opportunities for the Palestinian people.
The Oslo strategy for Palestinian economic development involved
four pillars: (1) international aid; (2) continued close Israeli-Palestinian
economic relations; (3) foreign investment; and (4) Palestinian access to
foreign markets.9 These elements formed an interdependent and complex
approach to Palestinian economic development. International aid was
intended to assist the Palestinians in building a modern economic infra-
structure that would lay foundations to attract foreign investment. Close
economic arrangements between the Palestinians and Israel would, in the
short term, give Palestinian labor and goods access to Israeli markets. In
the long term, it would allow the Palestinian Territories to integrate into
the regional economy. Foreign investment would be attracted by
Palestinian access not only to the Israeli market but also to regional and
other international markets, as the Palestinian Territories could serve as
an export platform. Thus, Palestinian access to other markets besides
Israel was critical to the development of the private sector generally and
the inflow of foreign investment specifically.
The mechanisms designed to implement this Palestinian economic
development strategy were an international aid program, the Protocol on
Economic Relations between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Or-
ganization (Economic or Paris Protocol), 0 and the creation of an "ena-
bling environment" of political and legal reforms to promote private sec-
tor development in the Palestinian Territories.
palecon.orglupdate/index.html> (containing quarterly publications updating the con-
dition of the Palestinian economy); United Nations Office of the Special Coordinator
in the Occupied Territories, UNSCO Report on Economic and Social Conditions in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Spring 1998) (visited Sept. 8, 1998)
<http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/mepp/unsco/unqr.html>.
8 David P. Fidler, Peace Through Trade? Developments in Palestinian Trade Law
During the Peace Process, 38 VA. J. INT'L. L. 155, 156 (1998). See discussion infra
Part I.B (discussing current problems with Palestinian economic development).
9 See Fidler, supra note 8, at 156-57 (describing these four fundamental elements
of the Oslo economic strategy for the Palestinian Territories).
10 Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of the State of Israel
and the P.L.O., Representing the Palestinian People 33 I.L.M. 696 [hereinafter Eco-
nomic Protocol], in Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Sept. 28,
1995, Isr.-PLO, 36 LL.M. 551, 639 [hereinafter Oslo II].
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1. International Aid Program
Less than a month after the signing of the Declaration of Principles
on September 13, 1993," forty-seven countries attended the Conference
to Support Middle East Peace and pledged approximately U.S.$2 billion
in aid over a five-year period to support the development of the Palestin-
ian economy and the transition to Palestinian self-rule. 2 Central to this
international aid program "was that such aid would be primarily used to
build the economic infrastructure necessary to encourage private invest-
ment in the Palestinian Territories. 13
2. Economic Protocol
The Economic Protocol established the framework for Palestinian
economic relations with Israel and the rest of the world for the interim
period. The Economic Protocol laid down the structure for the movement
of goods and labor between Israel and the Palestinian Territories and for
Palestinian trade with the rest of the world. Essentially, the Economic
Protocol created a free trade area between Israel and the Palestinian Ter-
ritories, a modified customs union based on Israeli customs duties and
rules, and the opportunity for the PNA to open foreign markets for Pal-
estinian exports. Under the Economic Protocol, Palestinian goods were
to move freely into the Israeli market. 4 Such access to the significant
Israeli market "promised to eliminate the discriminatory treatment suf-
fered by Palestinian goods during the period of occupation."'5
The Economic Protocol did not, however, provide for free movement
of labor between Israel and the Palestinian Territories. It merely states
that both parties "will attempt to maintain the normality of movement of
labor between them," but each determines "the extent and conditions of
the labor movement into its area."'6 Israeli control over Palestinian labor
flows into Israel, combined with Israel's policy of systematically reduc-
"1 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13,
1993, Isr.-PLO, 32 I.L.M. 1525 [hereinafter Declaration of Principles].
12 See Fidler, supra note 6, at 533-34.
13 Id. at 534 (citing Deborah Zabarenko, Global Meeting Set to Raise $2 Billion
for Mideast, Reuters, Oct. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS
File).
14 See Economic Protocol, supra note 10, arts. VIII(l), IX(I). The movement of
Palestinian agricultural products is subject to Israeli veterinary and phytosanitary
measures and certain quotas to be phased out by 1998. See id. art. VIII(2)-(10).
15 Fidler, supra note 8, at 162.
16 Economic Protocol, supra note 10, art. VII(l).
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ing the level of Palestinian employment in Israel, heightens the impor-
tance of the development of the Palestinian private sector, which would
need to absorb growing numbers of Palestinian workers.
The modified customs union established in the Economic Protocol
subjected Palestinian imports to the Israeli customs regime,'7 with the
exception of certain products that could be imported at tariff rates set by
the PNA. 8 Thus, Israeli customs rules and practices would largely drive
Palestinian imports. Although during the Economic Protocol negotiations
the Palestinians pushed for a free trade arrangement that would allow
them to set their own tariffs on imports, Israel wanted a customs union
to avoid recognizing Palestinian borders as would be required under a
free trade arrangement. 9 The political positions of the two sides led to
the modified customs union, a compromise that "borrows certain ele-
ments of both a common market and a free trade area agreement."2
As for Palestinian exports to markets other than Israel, Oslo II
granted the PNA the authority to negotiate agreements with States and
international organizations to open foreign markets for Palestinian
goods."' For the Palestinian private sector to develop, greater access to
world markets would be needed, and such access "would also help at-
tract foreign investors who might be interested in the Palestinian Territo-
ries as an export platform.'
3. Enabling Environment
When the Declaration of Principles was signed, it was clear the Pal-
estinians had much work ahead creating the appropriate political and
legal environment to encourage and assist private sector development.
Decades of occupation left the Palestinian political and legal systems ill-
prepared for facilitating a modern, market economy. The World Bank
stressed in 1993 that many policy, legal, and institutional reforms were
needed in the Palestinian Territories "in order to create a climate condu-
cive to sustainable economic and social development.' '  Central to creat-
ing the proper enabling environment for private sector development are
'7 Id. art. I(1).
18 See id. arts. 11H(2), 1m1(4), 111(10).
19 See Ephraim Kleiman, The Economic Provisions of the Agreement Between Is-
rael and the PLO, 28 ISR. L. REV. 347, 354-55 (1994).
' Id. at 355.
21 Oslo II, supra note 10, art. IX(5)(b).
2 Fidler, supra note 8. at 162-63.
2 1 WORLD BANK, supra note 7, at 17.
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
transparent, modern, and efficient legal, regulatory, and institutional
rules and processes.24 Thus, legal reform and credible political institu-
tions to implement the law are critical to the development of a modern
Palestinian economy.
B. Breakdown of the Oslo Strategy for Palestinian Economic Devel-
opment
Immediately after signing of the Declaration of Principles, optimism
about the future of the Palestinian economy prevailed. As the World
Bank observed, "[a] low-cost, well-educated work force with a strong
entrepreneurial tradition, anticipated privileged access to markets (in
Israel, the rest of the Middle East, and Europe), a Palestinian diaspora
that is ready and able to provide investment funds, and committed sup-
port from the international community give the West Bank and Gaza ap-
preciable economic potential." Events have shattered this optimism as
the Palestinian economy has suffered since September 1993. The July-
August 1998 issue of the Palestine Economic Pulse captured the misfor-
tune of the Palestinian economy as follows: "[t]he once optimistic future
for Palestine's economy with its rich human resource base, its strategic
geo-political location and religious significance, envisioned by many and
documented in many literary sources.., has faded into oblivion." None
of the elements of the Oslo strategy for Palestinian economic develop-
ment has been achieved, which threatens the economic pillar of the peace
process. In mid-June 1998, the U.S. Undersecretary for Economic, Busi-
ness, and Agricultural Affairs referred to the condition of the Palestinian
economy as a crisis.27 The early fears that economic deprivation in the
Palestinian Territories would affect attitudes towards the peace process
find empirical support in the fact that "most West Bankers and Gazans
actually blame their economic difficulties on Oslo. ' Despite the eco-
nomic troubles, Palestinians by and large still support the peace proc-
24 See id. (discussing the legal and regulatory framework).
25 World Bank, West Bank and Gaza (visited Mar. 29, 1999) <http://www.
world-bank.org/html/extdr/offrep/mena/wb&g.htm>.
26 The Paris Protocol Gridlock. .. What Next?, PALESTINE ECON. PULSE, July-
Aug. 1998, at 2, 3.
27 See id. at 2; see also Jawad Naji, From the Editor, PALESTINE ECON. PULSE,
Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 1, 1 (citing the Undersecretary's argument that "peace between
Israelis and Palestinians would never take hold unless accompanied by 'jobs and eco-
nomic security"').
28 Khalil Shikaki, The Politics of Paralysis II: Peace Now or Hamas Later,
FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 1998, at 29, 42.
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ess, 9 but such support remains vulnerable to the effects of continued bad
economic times.
1. Problems with International Aid
The breakdown in the Oslo economic development strategy is com-
prehensive. The international aid intended to jump start the re-
construction of the Palestinian economic infrastructure has been diverted
to keeping the PNA afloat and funding emergency employment pro-
grams.' Controversies about delays in the distribution of aid have also
dogged the relations between the PNA and the donor community. 3' Thus,
"[t]he interdependence between public aid and private investment, identi-
fied by the World Bank and the donor countries as the key dynamic of
economic development for Gaza and the West Bank, has not yet been
established."'
2. Problems with the Economic Protocol
The Economic Protocol's free trade arrangement under which Pales-
tinian goods were to move freely into Israeli markets has, from the Pales-
tinian perspective, collapsed because of Israeli border closures and other
security measures. Border closures have also created havoc for Palestin-
ian labor flows into Israel.33 The border closures, in response to political
violence, pit Israel's need for security against the Palestinian need for
29 See id. (arguing that "[e]conomic failure does not erode Palestinian faith in the
peace process").
30 See World Bank, West Bank and Gaza Update, First Quarter 1998, (visited Feb.
24, 1999) <http://www.palecon.orglupdate/mar98/contents.html> (noting that nega-
tive political and economic events in the peace process "have thwarted donors' inten-
tions and often impaired the most efficient use of their resources" and that "[d]onor
assistance was redirected from intended investment to consumption-oriented, non-
investment support aimed at mitigating the negative impact of these shocks").
31 See Fidler, supra note 6, at 541 (discussing Palestinian concerns over the aid
program).
32 Id. at 543. According to the United Nations Office of the Special Coordinator in
the Occupied Territories in February 1998, U.S.$3.63 billion has been pledged by
donor countries to the PNA, U.S.$3.03 billion has been committed, and U.S.$1.83
billion has been disbursed to support Palestinian development. See United Nations
Office of the Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories, Special Report: The
West Bank and Gaza Strip Private Economy, pt. V.B (Feb. 1998)
<http://www.arts.mcgill.calmepp/unscolprivate/report.html> (visited Sept. 9, 1998).
33 See Fidler, supra note 8, at 163-67 (discussing the havoc wreaked on the Pales-
tinian economy by border closures).
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economic development.'M According to the Palestine Economic Pulse,
attempts to find solutions to this basic clash of interests have largely
proved to be a "dialogue of the deaf."' Leaving aside the border closure
problem, the modified customs union arrangement has not worked well
for the Palestinians. Palestinians complain that Israeli non-tariff barriers
adversely affect Palestinian exports to Israel.6 In addition, the instability
of the business climate in the Palestinian Territories has encouraged
many Palestinian businesses to import products "under the name of an
Israeli intermediary, and in so doing, deprive the PNA of revenue which
it is rightfully due."'37 Frustration with the Economic Protocol has also
arisen because the modified customs union imposes on the Palestinian
economy tariff costs higher than those the PNA would likely charge if it
had control of Palestinian import policy.8 Palestinian businesses and
consumers pay higher prices for imports, while facing greatly restricted
access to Israeli and world markets because of border closures and non-
tariff barriers. Given all these factors, it is hardly surprising that the na-
ture of the Israeli-Palestinian economic relationship structured in the
34 See Palestinian-Israeli Economic Relations, PALESTINE ECON. PULSE, May-June
1998, at 4, 4 ("For Palestinians, the primary issue of free access to import and export
markets collides with the central Israeli concern of security at all levels of debate");
Mel Levine, Palestinian Economic Progress Under the Oslo Agreements, 19
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1393, 1406 (1996) (arguing that the Israeli-Palestinian situation
"is a classic political/economic conundrum").
35 Palestinian-Israeli Economic Relations, supra note 34, at 4. But see Wye River
Memorandum, supra note 1, art. III (renewing processes to work on economic devel-
opment in parallel with security issues).
36 See Fidler, supra note 8, at 166 (discussing Israeli non-tariff barriers on Pales-
tinian exports).
37 The Paris Protocol Gridlock . . . What Next?, supra note 26, at 3. The PNA
loses such revenue because, under the Economic Protocol, customs duties paid on
products destined for the Palestinian Territories are to be paid to the PNA. Economic
Protocol, supra note 10, art. 111(15). The use of Israeli intermediaries means that
goods really destined for the West Bank or Gaza are marked as Israeli imports, mean-
ing the tariff payments go to Israel rather than the PNA. The payment of such tariff
revenues to the PNA "is fundamental to the revenue performance of the PNA." De-
velopment in Palestine: A New Direction, PALESTINE ECON. PULSE, May-June 1996, at
2, 2. The practice of using Israeli intermediaries has resulted in the loss of "tens of
millions of dollars of revenue" by the PNA. Keith C. Molkner, Legal and Structural
Hurdles to Achieving Political Stability and Economic Development in the Palestin-
ian Territories, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1419, 1448 (1996); see also Naji, supra note
27, at I (noting in late 1998 that "[m]onies lost to the Israeli treasury in this respect
are estimated to have cost the PNA some $350 million per annum").
38 Fidler, supra note 8, at 167.
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Economic Protocol is being critically questioned.' Access to the lucra-
tive Israeli market promised in the Economic Protocol aimed at attract-
ing private investment, but the failure of the access to materialize in any
significant way has deterred private investment in the Palestinian Terri-
tories.
While the PNA has been active in negotiating trade arrangements
and agreements with other States,' Palestinian exports to world markets
have not increased substantially because such exports have been depend-
ent on Israeli ports and thus have been subject to the same problems as
exports to Israel. This continuing need for Israeli trade access and infra-
structure produces the situation that "the complex maze of documented
trade agreements and mechanisms . . . have in practice done little to
change its economic dependence on Israel." '4 Foreign investors have not,
therefore, had much reason to view the Palestinian Territories as a stable
export platform for accessing markets in Europe, the Middle East, and
elsewhere. The stunted condition of Palestinian exports to world markets
detrimentally affects overall Palestinian private sector development.
3. Problems with the Enabling Environment
Finally, the enabling environment considered central to developing
the Palestinian economy has not materialized politically, economically,
or legally. Widespread corruption has severely "tarnished the Palestinian
Authority and further hurt prospects for Palestinian economic develop-
39 See, e.g., Palestinian-Israeli Trade Relations: Free Trade Area or Customs Un-
ion? I PALESTINE ECON. PoLIcY RESEARCH INST. 1 (Nov. 1996) (M.A.S.) (visited Sept.
8, 1998) <http://www.palecon.org/masdir/notes/freetrade.html> (reporting on eco-
nomic forum debating optimal trade regime for Palestinian Territories); Fidler, supra
note 8, at 188 (arguing that "the free trade area plus customs union arrangement
needs to be replaced with a straight free trade agreement between the Palestinians
and Israel"); Palestinian-Israeli Economic Relations, supra note 34, at 4 (reporting
on exchange of views at seminar on Israeli-Palestinian economic relations); Political
Separation and Economic Integration, PALESTINE ECON. PULSE, May-June 1998, at 5
(reporting on economic integration ideas of Shimon Peres); The Paris Protocol Grid-
lock . . . What Next?, supra note 26, at 2 (analyzing the Economic Protocol); Joe
Saba, The World Bank on Palestinian Competitiveness, PALESTINE ECON. PULSE,
Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 3, 3-6 (recounting a recent speech by World Bank Resident Mis-
sion Director for the West Bank and Gaza arguing that the Economic Protocol and its
application hurt Palestinian competitiveness).
40 The PNA has negotiated trade agreements with Jordan, Egypt, and the European
Union, and is negotiating agreements with Turkey and the European Free Trade As-
sociation. In addition, the PNA has a free trade arrangement with the United States.
41 Jawad Naji, From the Editor ... , PALESTINE ECON. PULSE, Mar.-Apr. 1998, at
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ment." 42 After an internal audit revealed that PNA corruption and mis-
management wasted approximately U.S.$326 million, or forty percent of
the PNA's annual budget, the Palestinian Legislative Council put serious
pressure on Arafat and his council to clean up the PNA. In June 1998,
Arafat "agreed to reshuffle the PNA Ministerial Cabinet accused of cor-
ruption, and appealed to the Palestinian Legislative Council... to delay
its proposed no-confidence vote."'43 While the PNA has moved to put an
end to the widespread corruption, the corruption scandal further deep-
ened the concerns of foreign investors about the Palestinian Territories
as an investment location. Moreover, the scandal constituted a manifest
failure by the PNA to create and maintain the proper political enabling
environment for private sector development.
Economically, the PNA's public statements about its desire to pro-
mote a free market economy clash with its "practice of creating trade
monopolies for itself."' The PNA has established import monopolies on
a number of products. 41 The PNA trade monopolies are not secretive
matters as "[c]oncerns about the attempts by the Palestinian Authority to
monopolize sectors of the Palestinian economy are commonplace among
investors and groups trying to facilitate the peace process and Palestin-
ian economic development." 46 The Israeli director of the Is-
rael/Palestinian Center for Research and Information (IPCRI) has argued
that PNA monopolistic behavior "will strangle the private sector and de-
lay or prevent economic development."' In the wake of the corruption
scandal, the PNA has moved to reorganize or privatize government eco-
42 Fidler, supra note 8, at 184-85 (discussing PNA corruption and its effects on
Palestinian economic development) (citing Neil MacFarquhar, The Sullen Love: As
Gaza Stagnates, Arafat is Blamed as Well as Israel, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1997, at
1). After investigating PNA corruption, David Hirst of The Guardian newspaper con-
cluded in April 1997 that Arafat "and his coterie of unofficial economic 'advisors'
have thrown up a ramshackle, nepotistic edifice of monopoly, racketeering and naked
extortion which merely enriches them as it further impoverishes society at large."
David Hirst, Shameless in Gaza, GUARDIAN, Apr. 21, 1997, at 9.
43 Economic Diary, PALESTINE ECON. PULSE, July-Aug. 1998, at 15, 15.
44 Fidler, supra note 8, at 183.
45 See Hirst, supra note 42, at 9.
46 Fidler, supra note 8, at 183.
"7 Id. at 183 (quoting Letter to President Clintoi from Gershon Baskin, Israeli
Director of the Israel/Palestinian Center for Research and Information, Apr. 4, 1997
(on file with author)); see also Saba, supra note 39, at 4-5 (analyzing the detrimental
economic consequences of the development of "Palestinian public or semi-public mo-
nopolies" for importing goods).
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nomic enterprises;' but the monopolies, like the corruption scandal, have
hurt the development of an enabling environment for Palestinian eco-
nomic development.
The need for legal and regulatory reform identified in 1993 as criti-
cal for private sector development remains an obstacle to Palestinian
economic development. Five years after first identifying the need for le-
gal and regulatory reform, the World Bank still maintains that "the busi-
ness environment suffers from confusing commercial legislation and a
lack of public sector regulatory institutions."' While efforts have been
made by the PNA to address the needs for legal reform, these efforts
have not always been successful. The Investment Law is a case in point.
Despite the central importance of foreign investment to Palestinian eco-
nomic development, the original Investment Law promulgated by the
PNA was criticized by intergovernmental and academic experts as an
inadequate legal response for Palestinian economic development.' Simi-
lar concerns have been expressed about the Palestinian telecommunica-
tions law5' and the laws to regulate the industrial estates within the Pal-
estinian Territories. 52 The Palestinian Stock Exchange has been operating
for over a year without an adequate regulatory framework or securities
4 See Saba, supra note 39, at 6 (urging PNA to privatize the public and semi-
public enterprises dominating importing).
49 WORLD BANK, supra note 25; see also Saba, supra note 39, at 4 (World Bank
official arguing in September 1998 that Palestinian economic development is still
hindered by the "[c]ontinued lack of development of the legal infrastructure for busi-
ness").
50 See, e.g., The Legal Framework for Business in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
MAS POL'Y NOTES 3 (Sept. 1996) Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute
(MAS) <http://www.palecon.orgfmasdir/notes/framework.html> (discussing critical
comments of Joseph Battat of the World Bank on the original Investment Law);
WORLD BANK, supra note 25 (arguing the PNA "should give early attention to passage
of a new investment law"); Fidler, supra note 6, at 529 (providing a critical analysis
of Original Investment Law); David P. Fidler, Economic Development, Foreign In-
vestment and the Peace Process: Recent Events Make Revision of Palestinian Invest-
ment Law Even More Critical, MIDDLE E. EXECUTIVE REP., Nov. 1996, at 8.
51 See Sam Bahour, Telecommunications Regulations... Competency is a Must,
PALESTINE ECON. PULSE, May-June 1998, at 13 (Stating that "[a] serious review of
this Law ... is urgently needed. In its current somewhat antiquated form, it lacks the
necessary provisions for the dynamic challenges facing the global telecommunications
sector").
52 See Ezra Sadan, Industrial Parks in Territories Controlled by the Palestinian
Authority (visited Mar. 5, 1999) <http://www.ipcri.org/ind.html> (reporting that po-
tential investors are worried about incomplete legislation).
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law. 3 Impediments regarding basic commercial and property laws must
be addressed to create an attractive environment for private sector in-
vestment.54 While international organizations, governments, and non-
governmental organizations are working with the PNA on legal reform,55
much work remains in creating the proper legal enabling environment for
private sector development.
Larger legal issues also complicate Palestinian economic develop-
ment. For example, Arafat has not approved the Palestinian constitution
- the Basic Law - although it has been approved by the Palestine Leg-
islative Council.6 While Arafat's failure to sign may be related to the
lack of progress in the peace process and the anomaly of enacting a con-
stitution when the PNA does not even control its own borders, the ab-
sence of this fundamental law adds to the legal vacuum businesses per-
ceive in the Palestinian Territories.57 It also contributes to concerns
about the PNA's lack of respect for human rights, prominently docu-
mented in a critical report by Amnesty International. 5 The Wye Memo-
ranum also highlighted PNA human rights problems by providing that
"the Palestinian Police will exercise powers and responsibilities to im-
plement this Memorandum with due regard to internationally accepted
53 See The PSE - Ahead of Its Time, PALESTINE ECON. PULSE, May-June 1998, at
11 (noting that "[r]egulation is also still a serious problem").
54 See Saba, supra note 39, at 4 (noting the need to improve Palestinian tax, judi-
cial, commercial, and property laws).
55 See, e.g., World Bank, West Bank and Gaza Update, Second Quarter 1998 (vis-
ited Sept. 8, 1998) <http://www.palecon.orglupdate/jun98/operations.html> (report-
ing on World Bank's U.S.$5.5 million Legal Development Project that "aims at as-
sisting the PA in modernizing the legal framework and increasing the efficiency and
predictability of the judicial process" and on World Bank's specific efforts on insur-
ance, securities, mortgage, tax, mutual funds, and competition law reform).
56 See THE PALESTINIAN BASIC LAW (Third Reading) (1998) (Palestine), translated
by Saladin Al-Jurf [hereinafter BASIC LAW]. The text of the PALESTINIAN BASIC LAW is
reprinted in the Appendix to this issue of the Case Western Reserve Journal of Inter-
national Law. 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT'LL. 495 (1999); Julian Borger, The Shadow of
the Hawk, GUARDIAN, Aug. 17, 1998, at 2 ("Arafat has so far withheld his signature
from a basic law that would provide the [Palestinian Authority] with a constitutional
structure").
57 See Deborah Horan, Israeli and Palestinian Investors Are for Peace, Inter Press
Serv., Feb. 2, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File (noting con-
cerns of businessmen about the lack of a basic law and the condition of laws govern-
ing commerce).
58 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY: PROLONGED POLITICAL
DETENTION, TORTURE AND UNFAIR TRIALS, AI INDEX: MDE 15/68/96 (1996); see also
Fidler, supra note 8, at 185-86 (discussing human rights abuses of PNA).
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norms of human rights and the rule of law, and will be guided by the
need to protect the public, respect human dignity, and avoid harass-
ment."'59 As of yet, the "rule of law" does not characterize Arafat's or the
PNA's governance of the Palestinian economy or people.
4. Private Investment in the Palestinian Territories
All these factors have combined to create low levels of private in-
vestment, both domestic and foreign, in the Palestinian Territories. Do-
mestically, most of the private investment has been channeled into resi-
dential housing, a type of investment that "has lesser impact in terms of
increasing the productive capacity of the economy." The World Bank
noted that "[p]rivate investment over the 1994 to 1997 period (excluding
housing, which does not expand productive capacity) averaged a low
8.75 percent of GDP. ' '61 The World Bank estimates that, in 1996, gross
investment in residential housing amounted to fourteen percent of GNP,
while gross investment in machinery and equipment totaled seven percent
of GNP.62 The International Monetary Fund estimates that private in-
vestment levels of fifteen to twenty percent of GDP are needed for tangi-
ble economic growth.63
Foreign investment has also been very low. Although the PNA
claims there has been approximately U.S.$1 billion in foreign investment
in the Palestinian Territories, this number corresponds to the amount of
money contributed in a variety of ways, from business investment to re-
mittances to family members by Palestinian diaspora. Thus, it is hard to
give much weight to the PNA claims of U.S.$1 billion in actual foreign
investment.
More revealing is the rise and fall of Builders for Peace, a non-
profit organization established by the Clinton administration, after the
signing of the Declaration of Principles, to encourage foreign investment
in the Palestinian Territories. Organized in the optimistic days of the
post-Declaration period, Builders for Peace closed its doors in August
59 Wye River Memorandum, supra note 1, art. Il.C.4.
60 World Bank, West Bank and Gaza Update, First Quarter 1998, supra note 7;
see also United Nations Office of the Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories,
supra note 7, at 6 ("Residential construction has been and remains the main type of
private investment in the WBGS").
61 World Bank, supra note 30.
62 See id.
63 See Palestine Special Report, MEED Weekly Special Report, July 17, 1998,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File (citing IMF analysis of Palestinian
private investment).
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
1997 because the investment climate in the Palestinian Territories was
inhospitable to foreign investors. In addition, the highly touted industrial
zones to be established in Gaza and the West Bank, which were intended
to attract foreign investors, have captured the interest of mainly local
Palestinian business, Israeli companies, and some Palestinian diaspora
groups.64 Israeli actions also seem to be undermining the potential of the
Palestinian industrial zones as "Israel currently plans to develop an in-
dustrial estate on confiscated Palestinian land in the West Bank in Kufr
Qumran near Nablus."' This Israeli move seems "to undermine the
whole purpose" of the Gaza industrial estate.6
Although the economic outlook for the Palestinian economy is
bleak, private sector investment initiatives continue, as indicated by the
slow progress made on the industrial estates. The recently established
Peace Technology Fund (PTF) is another innovative attempt to increase
private sector investment in the Palestinian Territories. The PTF consists
of investment capital from Palestinians (domestic and diaspora), Israelis,
and the World Bank.67 The fundamental objective of the PTF "is to in-
vest in Palestine... in support of economic development."' The PTF's
creators hope the Fund will be a catalyst for attracting foreign inves-
tors.6 The initial investment strategy of the PTF shows, however, the
marks of the generally poor investment climate in the Palestinian Territo-
ries. For example, the Fund does not plan to provide resources to new
ventures but "to buy minority shares in existing Palestinian-owned busi-
nesses in the West Bank and Gaza."'7 In addition, the PTF will avoid
investments in businesses that depend on sales in Israel and abroad be-
cause such businesses bear the full brunt of border closures and other
64 See WORLD BANK, supra note 25 (noting that surveys indicate that the initial
tenants of the Gaza industrial zone "will come mainly from existing enterprises in
Gaza, and some West Bank, Israeli, and overseas Palestinian groups"); see also
Fidler, supra note 8, at 180-81 (discussing problems that have plagued the industrial
zones concept).
65 Political Separation and Economic Integration, supra note 39, at 5.
66 id.
67 See Horan, supra note 57.
68 Marie-Helene Nougaret, The Peace Fund-An Investment Model?, PALESTINE
ECON. PULSE, Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 4, 5.
69 See id. at 5 (quoting World Bank representative Tamara Lansky as stating that
the Fund "would also like to act as a catalyst to attract foreign investments").
70 Horan, supra note 57.
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Israeli actions.7 In spite of the latest efforts to increase private sector
investment, the future of the PTF remains uncertain.'
Another prominent investment initiative is the Bethlehem 2000 Pro-
ject, a U.S.$300 million project that will "attempt to set the course to-
wards the millennium celebrations and simultaneously provide a better
and more suitable environment for the tourism industry into the next
decade."'73 All is not well, however, with this endeavor, as analyzed early
in 1998 by the Palestine Economic Pulse.74 Funding, infrastructure de-
velopment, Israeli cooperation, PNA coordination, and lack of adequate
time constitute problems for the Bethlehem 2000 Project.75
The preceding brief look at Palestinian private sector investment
suggests that foreign investors will not be pouring money into the Pales-
tinian Territories regardless of how good the Revised Investment Law is.
The question to which I turn next is whether the PNA has created even
more disincentives for foreign investors in the Revised Investment Law.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PALESTINIAN INVESTMENT LAW
The adoption and revision of the Palestinian Investment Law form
part of the PNA's attempt to create the proper legal enabling environ-
ment for investment. Between the Declaration of Principles in 1993 and
the adoption of the original Palestinian Investment Law in 1995, the le-
gal structure for investment in the Palestinian Territories was inade-
quate. A 1994 IPCRI analysis argued that the legal environment for in-
vestment suffered from five major problems: (1) governmental authori-
ties had too much discretion in the investment approval process; (2) free
transferability of profits and capital was not guaranteed; (3) governmen-
tal authorities could retroactively cancel benefits and impose severe pen-
alties without reference to transparent standards and without adequate
legal recourse against such actions; (4) investors were not protected
against expropriation, and the laws provided for no standard of compen-
sation; and (5) access to international arbitration to settle disputes was
71 See id.
72 See Nougaret, The Peace Fund-An Investment Model, supra note 68, at 6
(discussing the uncertain future of the PTF).
73 World Bank, supra note 55 (detailing the Bethlehem 2000 Project and the
World Bank's contribution to it); see also Palestine Special Report, supra note 63
(describing Bethlehem 2000 Project).
74 0 Little Town of Bethlehem ... How Still We See Thee Lie, PALESTINE ECON.
PULSE, Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 2.
75 See id. at 2-3.
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inadequate.76 The need for a modern, unified investment law was recog-
nized early in the peace process; but the Original Investment Law was
not adopted until April 1995.7 When the Investment Law was adopted, it
was a disappointment. As noted earlier, the Original Investment Law
was criticized by intergovernmental and academic experts as inadequate.
In response to such criticisms, the PNA engaged in consultations with
the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme seek-
ing advice on how to improve the law. This process transpired during
1996-1997, and the PNA promulgated the Revised Investment Law in
April 1998. It subsequently went into effect in May 1998.
I. ANALYSIS OF THE REVISED INVESTMENT LAW
This part of the Article analyzes the official English-language trans-
lation of the official Arabic text of the Revised Investment Law, which is
provided as an Appendix to this Article.78 The Revised Investment Law
provides that the Palestinian Investment Promotion Agency will issue
implementing Regulations for the Law,' which will become an important
part of the legal investment regime but are not available for analysis in
English as of this writing. The analysis examines the provisions of the
Revised Investment Law and explores ambiguities, questions, and prob-
lems that a reading of the text reveal. I also note where the Revised In-
vestment Law does not adhere to international standards and practices
incorporated in the World Bank's Guidelines on the Treatment of For-
eign Direct Investment s° and bilateral and multilateral treaties dealing
with the treatment of foreign investment, including the proposed Multi-
lateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) being negotiated under the aus-
pices of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD). 81
76 Keith Molkner & Ra'ed Abdul Hamid, The Legal Structure for Foreign Invest-
ment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 1 I.P.C.R.I. L. & DEV. PROGRAM COM. L.
REP. 33-38 (1994) (analyzing legal situation applying to foreign investment in the
Palestinian Territories before the original Investment Law).
77 See Fidler, supra note 6, at 546 & n. 77 (describing recognition of need for new
investment law and repeated PNA promises that such a law would be adopted).
78 REVISED PALESTINIAN INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 5.
79 Id. art. 47 (stating "The Board of Directors shall issue the Regulations to im-
plement this Law ... ").
so World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, re-
printed in IBRAHIM F. I. SHIHATA. THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT:
THE WORLD BANK GUIDELINES 155-64 (1993) [hereinafter WORLD BANK GUIDELINES].
81 See generally Multilateral Agreement on Investment, MAI Negotiating Text
(visited Feb. 7. 1999), available at <http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/mai/negtext.htm>
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A. Scope of the Revised Investment Law
The scope of the Revised Investment Law comprises two factors:
(1) the range of investment opportunities in the Palestinian economy
covered by the Law; and (2) the types of investments covered by the
Law. Article 4 of the Revised Investment Law states that "[a]ny Investor
may invest in any sector of the Palestinian economy; provided, however,
that the Investment is not prohibited by specific laws."82 This apparently
open investment policy is, however, compromised by the definition of
"Investment" and by other provisions in the Revised Investment Law.
"Investment" is defined "as actual monetary investment of capital (fixed
capital assets) by an Investor in an Enterprise, whether a newly created
or an existing enterprise."83
This definition of Investment creates confusion because it can be in-
terpreted narrowly or broadly. Under a narrow interpretation, an Invest-
ment only includes monetary expenditures of capital in fixed capital as-
sets, which excludes capital expenditures for equity and debt securities,
real estate, or investments in kind, such as intellectual property and
know how. All these types of capital expenditures form part of making
investments in new or existing enterprises, but their exclusion from a
narrow interpretation of Investment means that they would not be (1)
protected by the general guarantees provided by the Revised Investment
Law,8 or (2) eligible for the incentives offered by the Law." While ex-
cluding certain types of investments from the incentives makes sense, the
possible exclusion of any investment from the protections of the Revised
Investment Law should be a source of investor concern. For example,
under a narrow interpretation of investment, Peace Technology Fund eq-
uity investments in existing Palestinian companies would not be covered
(reprinting the text as of April 24, 1998) [hereinafter MAI]. Although the MAI has
not been finalized for adoption by States, it does provide valuable information about
international standards for treatment of foreign investment. See also generally Multi-
lateral Agreement on Investment: Report by the Chairman of the Negotiating Group
(Apr. 28, 1998) (visited Mar. 1, 1999) <http://www.oecd.orgldaf/cmis/mai/
repor98.htm>.
82 REVISED PALESTINIAN INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 5, art. 7
83 Id. art. 1. See Fidler, supra note 6, at 555-56 (discussing problems with the
definition of "investment" in the Original Investment Law); LAW ON THE
ENCOURAGEMENT OF INVESTMENT (1995) (Palestine), art. 1, translated in Fidler, supra
note 6, app. at 603.
84 See discussion infra Part II.B (discussing the general guarantees in the Revised
Investment Law).
85 See discussion infra Part ]I.D (discussing the incentives in the Revised Invest-
ment Law).
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by the general guarantees provided in the Revised Investment Law. The
narrow interpretation of Investment would substantially reduce the scope
of the Revised Investment Law and raises serious concerns for investors.
A narrow definition of Investment in the Revised Investment Law
would also cut against international standards and practices which use a
broader definition of investment that covers a wide variety of assets,
rights, and interests. Broad definitions of Investment are standard in
European and United States bilateral investment treaties. s These broad
definitions include every kind of asset or investment, and often provide
specific, non-exclusive lists of assets that are covered by the defini-
tions.'
The definition of Investment can also be interpreted more broadly. If
the parenthetical containing the term "fixed capital assets" is intended
only to be illustrative rather than exclusive, then the definition of In-
vestment could include monetary investments of capital in equity and
debt securities, real estate, and investments in fixed capital assets. Two
concerns remain, however, with this broader interpretation. First, it still
does not include investments in kind, such as intellectual property and
know how, that are usually included in definitions of Investment in in-
vestment treaties. Second, the broad interpretation of Investment creates
problems for the Revised Investment Law's provisions that grant tax in-
centives for Investments because it would mean that the PNA would be
giving tax relief to Enterprises in which Investors merely made passive
investments. The PNA did not, I believe, intend to award tax incentives
for passive investments. The narrow interpretation of Investment makes
sense in connection with the Incentives provisions but seriously cuts
against international standards on defining Investment.
In all likelihood, the PNA intended the Revised Investment Law to
have a broad definition of Investment. The definition of Investment,
however, should also include investments in kind. It is my understanding
that the Regulations cover investments in kind. In addition, the Incen-
86 See RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 27
(1995).
87 See, e.g., MODEL UNITED STATES BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, art. I(d), re-
printed in Eleanor Roberts Lewis, The United States Bilateral Investment Treaty Pro-
gram: Protection for U.S. Investors Overseas, 1 CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK
SERIES 133, 134 (No. B-863) (1994); MODEL TREATY: TREATY BETWEEN THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND CONCERNING THE ENCOURAGEMENT AND
RECIPROCAL PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS, Feb. 1991, art. 1.1, reprinted in DOLZER &
STEVENS, supra note 86, annex I at 187 [hereinafter GERMAN INVESTMENT TREATY];
North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M.
605, 647-48, art. 1139 [hereinafter NAFTA]; MAI, supra note 81, § I, art. 2.
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tives provisions require a narrower term than Investments in order to
tailor the Incentives to the type of capital investments the PNA wants to
encourage. Perhaps the Regulations deal with this issue as well.
Other provisions also create questions about the scope of the Re-
vised Investment Law. Article 5, for example, subjects any investment in
seven important economic sectors to "pre-approval from the Council of
Ministers".88 Investing in any of these sectors subjects the investor to an
approval process that is explicitly political. As argued in connection with
the same provision in the Original Investment Law, "[g]iven the desper-
ate need for investment in such infrastructure and fundamental economic
areas, the rationale behind singling these industry sectors out for explic-
itly political approval is unclear."' The PNA's past penchant for corrup-
tion and creating economic monopolies combined with the carving out of
these basic economic sectors might raise worries among foreign investors
about the PNA playing politics with the economic development of impor-
tant sectors of the Palestinian economy.9 The Revised Investment Law
provides for no procedures about how an investor should approach the
Council of Ministers, nor does it contain any criteria to discipline the
deliberations by the Council of Ministers on such investment requests.
Moreover, it does not even state that such procedures and standards will
be provided for in the implementing Regulations. It is my understanding
that the Regulations require that an investor seeking to invest in one of
these seven economic sectors submit to the Council of Ministers a letter
supported by a recommendation from the Palestine Investment Promotion
88 REVISED PALESTINIAN INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 5, art. 5. The seven eco-
nomic sectors are: (1) manufacturing and distribution of weapons, ammunition or
their parts; (2) aviation industries, including airports; (3) electrical power generation
and distribution; (4) processing of petroleum and its derivatives; (5) reprocessing of
refuse and solid waste; (6) communications and telecommunications services; and (7)
radio and television. The Original Investment Law had a similar provision. See Law
on the Encouragement of Investment (1995) (Palestine), art. 14, translated in Fidler,
supra note 6, app. at 608. For an analysis of this Article 14, see Fidler, supra note 6,
at 567-68.
89 Fidler, supra note 6, at 568.
90 The World Bank Guidelines stress that "[e]ach State will take appropriate
measures for the prevention and control of corrupt business practices ...." WORLD
BANK GUIDELINES, art. 111.8, supra note 80, at 160. The importance of fighting corrupt
business practices was reinforced by the adoption in 1997 of the OECD Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transac-
tions. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, available in OECD Finance Investment, Taxa-
tion, and Competition (visited Feb. 1, 1999) <http://www.oecd.orgldaf/cmis/bribery/
20nov le.htm>.
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Agency (Agency). It is not clear, however, whether the Regulations con-
tain (1) rules on what information the investor must submit to the
Agency, (2) criteria to discipline the Agency's review of the application,
and (3) criteria to discipline the Council of Minister's review of the in-
vestor's letter and Agency recommendations. Thus, one of the most im-
portant international standards in foreign investment protection-
transparency-is not advanced by this political provision."
The scope of the Revised Investment Law is also affected by Article
44's prohibition against giving incentives to certain businesses, namely
commercial enterprises, insurance companies, real estate companies (ex-
cept developers), banks, foreign currency dealers, and any financial in-
stitution (except housing mortgage companies). 92 This exclusionary pro-
vision is ambiguous because it does not define "commercial enterprise."
Article 44 cannot mean that any enterprise engaged in commerce is ex-
cluded from benefiting from the incentives in the Revised Investment
Law. It is not clear, however, exactly what the exclusion covers. The
transparency of the Law suffers as a result. In addition, the rationale for
excluding these types of commercial undertakings is not clear, suggest-
ing the exclusion is more political than economic in nature.
Article 6 of the Revised Investment Law relates to the scope of the
Investment Law as it provides that "[a]ll Investments in Palestine must
be legally established and registered in accordance with the provisions of
this Law." 3 This provision probably means that all Enterprises in which
Investments are made must be established and in good standing under
Palestinian law for the Revised Investment Law to apply to such Enter-
prise and Investment. Thus, the transparent and effective functioning of
Palestinian company law is very important to the operation of the Re-
vised Investment Law. Foreign investors might be concerned about this
because the West Bank and Gaza do not yet have an unified company
law. Companies registered in either the West Bank or Gaza can, how-
91 See WORLD BANK GUIDELINES, art. M1.8, supra note 80, at 160 (describing need
to promote accountability and transparency in dealings with foreign investors); see
also Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [here-
inafter TRIMS] (containing the transparency principle in art. 6); General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade - Multilateral Trade Negotiations (the Uruguay Round): General
Agreement on Trade in Services, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 44, 49-50 (1994) [herein-
after GATS] (containing the transparency principle); MAI, supra note 81, § m.
9-_ REVISED PALESTINIAN INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 5, art. 44.
93 Id. art. 6.
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ever, conduct business in the other without having to register again in the
other jurisdiction. 4
A final provision that relates to the scope of the Revised Investment
Law is Article 46, which states that the Revised Investment Law "super-
sedes and replaces all prior laws dealing with investment in Palestine."5
The Revised Investment Law now constitutes the legal framework for
investments in the Palestinian Territories. It does, however, contain a
grandfather clause for incentives granted under prior laws so that such
incentives continue "until they terminate or expire under the terms of the
laws under which they were issued."'
B. General Guarantees
1. Non-Discrimination
Article 7(A) states that "[n]o Investor will be discriminated against
on any basis whatsoever in the application of the incentives provided for
under this Law." This non-discrimination provision raises two con-
cerns. First, the confusion about the definition of Investment affects the
interpretation of Article 7(A) because the term "Investor" could be inter-
preted to mean that only those individuals or companies that made In-
vestments (narrowly construed) are protected by the non-discrimination
principle. All investments of any kind should be covered by the protec-
tions of the principle of non-discrimination.
Second, the word "incentives" in Article 7(A) is ambiguous because
it is not clear whether this word means "Incentives" as defined by the
Revised Investment Law or has a broader meaning. If Article 7(A) ap-
plies the non-discrimination principle only to the Incentives granted by
the Revised Investment Law, then Article 7(A) is inadequate in terms of
international standards on non-discrimination. Bilateral and multilateral
investment agreements apply, for example, the non-discriminatory na-
tional treatment and most-favored-nation principles to all aspects of in-
vestments, not just to incentives. 9 If "incentives" has a broader meaning,
94 See generally SMALL BUSINESS SUPPORT PROJECT, HANDBOOK FOR PALESTINIAN
BUSINESSES: How TO CONDuT BUSINESS IN THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 13-33
(1996) (describing how to register businesses in the West Bank and Gaza).
95 REVISED PALESTINIAN INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 5, art. 46
9' Id. art. 43.
97 Id. art. 7(A).
98 See, e.g., MODEL UNITED STATES BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, art. II, re-
printed in Lewis, supra note 87, at 136; GERMAN INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 87,
art. 3; NAFTA, supra note 87, arts. 1102-03; GATS, supra note 91, arts. 1I(1), XVII;
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then foreign investors might be less concerned. Perhaps Article 7(A) is
intended to have the same scope as Article 18.2 of the Original Invest-
ment Law, stating that "[floreign, Arab and expatriate Palestinian inves-
tors shall enjoy the same rights and privileges as those granted to local
Palestinian investors." 9" Article 18.2 assured all foreign investors na-
tional treatment in connection with all rights and privileges available to
Palestinian investors. Article 7(A) should at least offer the same protec-
tions as Article 18.2 of the Original Investment Law. Perhaps the Regu-
lations provide more clarity on this important point.
The Revised Investment Law also undermines the non-
discrimination principle in Article 25(D), which provides that the PNA
"may grant preferential treatment or grant special guarantees or incen-
tives to the national Investor."' This is a prima facie violation of the
principle of national treatment, which is a fundamental international
standard on the protection of foreign investment.'0 '
Article 7(B) provides that the PNA may grant preferential treatment
to certain investors under trade and investment agreements. 2 This provi-
sion gives the PNA the flexibility to grant investors from certain coun-
tries preferential rights and privileges under agreements with other
States, much like the United States grants preferential investment ar-
rangements to investors from Canada and Mexico under NAFTA. Such
preferential treatment under bilateral or multilateral agreements does not
contradict international standards. 0 3
2. Nationalization and Expropriation
Article 8 prohibits the nationalization of any Investment.' The
scope of this prohibition depends, of course, on how broadly or narrowly
Investment is defined. The broad definition of Investment produces a
MAI, supra note 81, § Il, art. 1-2; WORLD BANK GUIDELINES, art. 1U.3, supra note 80,
at 158 (requiring national treatment); TRIMS, supra note 91, art. 2(2) (addressing
national treatment).
99 LAW ON THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF INVESTMENT (1995) (Palestine), art. 18(2),
translated in Fidler, supra note 6, app. at 608-09.
100 REVISED PALESTINIAN INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 5, art. 25(D).
101 See sources cited supra note 98.
102 REVISED PALESTINIAN INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 5, art. 7(B).
103 See WORLD BANK GUIDELINES, art. III.4, supra note 80, at 158-59 ("Nothing in
this Guideline will automatically entitle nationals of other States to the more favor-
able standards of treatment accorded to the nationals of certain States under any cus-
toms union or free trade area agreement").
104 REVISED PALESTINIAN INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 5, art. 8.
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wider scope of application for the prohibition on nationalization, which
is another argument in favor of the broad definition.
The Revised Investment Law prohibits the expropriation of any In-
vestment "except in exceptional cases for a public purpose, with due
process of law accorded to the Investor subject to an expropriation."'"
Again, the scope of the term Investment affects another key provision of
the Revised Investment Law. Foreign investors will be uncomfortable
with expropriation provisions that apply only to a narrow range of in-
vestments. Another serious problem with the expropriation provision is
that it does not contain the principle of non-discrimination, which repre-
sents an international standard in connection with expropriation."° The
Revised Investment Law is less explicit on this non-discrimination point
than the Original Investment Law, which provided that no investment
would be expropriated "irrespective of the investor's nationality.""0 One
interpretation of this issue is that the general non-discrimination provi-
sion in Article 7(A) applies to expropriation actions as well because pro-
tections against certain types of expropriations are "incentives" covered
by Article 7(A). As noted above, however, the scope of Article 7(A) is
not clear. A less charitable reading of Article 9 would note that the PNA
deliberately decided to refrain from including a non-discrimination prin-
ciple in its expropriation provisions despite the presence of such a prin-
ciple in the Original Investment Law and the importance of such a prin-
ciple in international standards on foreign investment because the PNA
desired to retain the ability to discriminate against certain investors on
the basis of nationality or some other factor.
Important to foreign investors is the standard of compensation in
cases of expropriation. The Original Investment Law contained no stan-
dards for compensation of investors for expropriations.'5 The Revised
105 Id. art. 9. See also id., art. 8 (stating the PNA "shall not expropriate any in-
vestment except by operation of Law").
106 See WORLD BANK GUIDELINES, art. IV.1, supra note 80, at 161 (permitting ex-
propriation only "without discrimination on the basis of nationality"); MODEL UNITED
STATES BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY art. E11(l), reprinted in Lewis, supra note 87,
at 136 (allowing expropriation only "in a non-discriminatory manner"); GERMAN
INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 87, art. 4(4) (applying "most-favored-nation treat-
ment" to expropriations); NAFTA, supra note 87, art. 1110(1) (expropriation only
"on a non-discriminatory basis"); MAI supra note 81, § IV, art. 2.1(b) (allowing
expropriation only "on a non-discriminatory basis").
107 LAW ON THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF INVESTMENT (1995) (Palestine), art. 18(1),
translated in Fidler, supra note 6, app. at 608; see Fidler, supra note 6, at 570-71
(discussing the expropriation provisions in the Original Investment Law).
l0 See Fidler, supra note 6, at 588.
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. [Vol. 31:293
Investment Law states that Investors subject to an expropriation "shall
be compensated the fair market value and for losses suffered because of
such expropriation."'" International standards suggest that compensation
for expropriation must be prompt, adequate, and effective."' Bilateral
and multilateral investment agreements often define in detail what
prompt, adequate, and effective compensation means. Adequate usually
means payment of the equivalent of the fair market value of the expro-
priated investment immediately before the act of expropriation oc-
curred."' Prompt is usually defined as payment of compensation without
10 REVISED PALESTINIAN INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 5, art. 9.
10 WORLD BANK GUIDELINES, art. IV.1-2, supra note 80, at 161 (defining appropri-
ate compensation as "adequate, effective and prompt" compensation); see MODEL
UNITED STATES BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY art. III(l), reprinted in Lewis, supra
note 87, at 138 (requiring "prompt, adequate and effective compensation"); GERMAN
INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 87, art. 4(2) (laying out standard of compensation,
including value to be compensated without delay); NAFTA, supra note 87, art.
1110(2)-(6) (laying out compensation requirements); MAI, supra note 81, § IV, arts.
2.1(d)-2.5 (setting out requirements for "prompt, adequate and effective compensa-
tion"). In international law, the prompt, adequate, and effective standard has been
controversial. See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT
357 (1994); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 531-45 (4th ed.
1990); Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the
Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 644-51 (1998).
My reference to "prompt, adequate, and effective compensation" as an international
practice is not intended to be a claim that this standard represents customary interna-
tional law. Guzman argues persuasively that the appearance of this standard in bilat-
eral investment treaties does not produce a rule of customary international law be-
cause of the lack of opinio juris on the part of developing States. Guzman, supra, at
684-88.
"' See WORLD BANK GUIDELINES, art. IV.3, supra note 80, at 161 (defining ade-
quate compensation as "fair market value of the taken asset as such value is deter-
mine immediately before the time at which the taking occurred"); MODEL UNITED
STATES BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, art. 111(2), reprinted in Lewis, supra note 87,
at 138 (providing the same); GERMAN INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 87, art. 4(2)
(providing the same); NAFTA, supra note 87, art. 1110(2) (providing the same);
MAI, supra note 81, § IV, art. 2.3 (providing the same).
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delay."' Effective compensation typically means that payment should be
fully realizable and freely transferable." 3
The Revised Investment Law provides for "fair market value" com-
pensation, as required by international standards, but it does not provide
a definition for this term. Therefore, it is ambiguous whether fair market
value means what it means in international agreements and guidelines on
investment. Perhaps the PNA will use the implementing Regulations to
provide a precise meaning for "fair market value." Article 11 of the Re-
vised Investment Law provides for the free transferability of "compensa-
tion payments for expropriations," which conforms to part of the stan-
dard for effective compensation in international investment agreements
and guidelines. The Revised Investment Law does not explicitly provide
for prompt and fully realizable compensation. The absence of these fun-
damental elements of international standards on expropriation should be
a source of concern for investors. The PNA responded to the criticisms
that the Original Investment Law lacked any standards for compensation
for expropriated investments, 1'4 but it proved unwilling in the Revised
Investment Law to provide all of what is commonplace on the standard
of compensation in international investment agreements and guidelines.
Not included in the Revised Investment Law, but important in inter-
national standards and practices, is protection for investors against uni-
lateral termination of contracts by governments for non-commercial rea-
sons. The World Bank Guidelines provide, for example, that the stan-
dards governing expropriations should also regulate governmental termi-
112 See WORLD BANK GUIDELINES, art. IV.8, supra note 80, at 163 (defining prompt
compensation to be compensation "paid without delay"; MODEL UNITED STATES
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, art. 111(2), reprinted in Lewis, supra note 87, at 138
(providing for payment without delay); GERMAN INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 87,
art. 4(2) (providing the same); NAFTA, supra note 87, art. 1110(3) (providing the
same); MAI, supra note 81, § IV, art. 2.2 (providing the same).
113 See WORLD BANK GUIDELINES, art. IV.7, supra note 80, at 163 (defining effec-
tive compensation); MODEL UNITED STATES BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, art.
mI(2), reprinted in Lewis, supra note 87, at 138 (providing for fully realizable and
freely transferable compensation payments); GERMAN INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note
87, art. 4(2) (providing that compensation payments be "effectively realizable and
freely transferable"); NAFTA, supra note 87, arts. 1110(3), 1110(6) (providing that
compensation payments be fully realizable and freely transferable); MAI, supra note
81, § IV, art. 2.4 (providing the same).
114 See The Legal Framework for Business in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, supra
note 50, 10 (describing comments of Joseph Battat of the World Bank that the
Original Investment Law makes "no mention of compensation"); Fidler, supra note 6,
at 571 ("The Investment Law is silent as to the standard that would govern the com-
pensation of an investor subject to expropriation").
319
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
nations of contracts with investors for non-commercial reasons. 15 Article
11 of the Revised Investment Law provides that compensation payments
for "unilateral termination of contracts for non-commercial reasons" are
freely transferable," 6 but nowhere does the Law provide standards for
non-commercial termination of investor contracts and for compensation
for such terminations.
3. Cancellation of Real Property Permits
Article 10 of the Revised Investment Law provides that no agency
of the PNA or other governmental entity may cancel permits issued in
connection with real property unless the Agency is consulted."7 In addi-
tion, real property permits held by investors "may not be canceled unless
for legal reasons or public purpose on the basis of non-discrimination.""'
Article 10 also provides that "[t]he injured Investor shall, through the
judicial system, have the right to request compensation for losses in-
curred as a result of the cancellation.""' 9 Article 10 directly addresses
one of the most problematic legal concerns in the Palestinian Territo-
ries-the unsettled legal regime for real property."n Positively, Article 10
extends the non-discrimination principle for Investors into the area of
treatment of real property claims. The explicit inclusion of the non-
discrimination principle in Article 10 underscores the prevailing confu-
sion about non-discrimination in the Revised Investment Law. On the
one hand, its inclusion in Article 10 could be used to reinforce the notion
that the general non-discrimination principle in Article 7(A) applies
widely throughout the Revised Investment Law. On the other hand, the
explicit inclusion of the non-discrimination protection in Article 10 ac-
centuates the confusion over the scope of Article 7(A) and raises the
question why an explicit inclusion of the non-discrimination principle
does not appear in the provisions on expropriation.
115 WORLD BANK GUIDELINES, art. IV.11, supra note 80, at 163-64 (applying stan-
dards on expropriation to unilateral termination of contracts for non-commercial rea-
sons).
116 REVISED PALESTINIAN INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 5, art. 11.
"' See id. art. 10. The Agency "may give its opinion within seven days from the
date of the request." Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
12 See The Legal Framework for Business in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, supra
note 50, IM 2-5 (describing comments of John MacFarlane of Birzeit University Law
Center on need for legal reform concerning land ownership); Eyal Benvenisti & Eyal
Zamir, Private Claims to Property Rights in the Future Israel-Palestinian Settlement,
89 AM. J. INT'LL. 295 (1995).
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Another problem with Article 10 is that it limits the Investor's re-
course to compensation "through the judicial system" and seemingly cuts
off recourse to independent arbitration granted as a general matter in
Article 41(B)(1) of the Revised Investment Law."' Given Article 10, a
dispute over a real property permit between an Investor and any
Palestinian governmental authority would be a dispute that relates "to
rights and obligation provided for in the Investment Law."'22 Article 10
confines an Investor's recourse for compensation in any such dispute to
the Palestinian judicial system. This is not an option likely to garner
support from foreign investors given the problems and controversies
surrounding the Palestinian judicial system.
4. Repatriation of Financial Resources
Free transferability of capital, profits, and other forms of financial
resources are very important to foreign investors. International standards
provide for such free transferability in a convertible currency at prevail-
ing market exchange rates, subject only to the operation of certain im-
portant public laws, such as bankruptcy law, securities law, criminal
law, tax law, and judicial orders and judgements.124 The Revised Invest-
ment Law largely conforms to international standards on the repatriation
of financial resources. Article 1 l's guarantee of free transferability cov-
ers all types of financial resources and provides for transferability "at
the applicable market currency exchange rates in effect at the time of
121 See discussion infra Part lII.E (analyzing the general dispute settlement provi-
sions of the Revised Investment Law).
122 REVISED PALESTINIAN INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 5, art. 40.
123 See Hiram E. Chodosh & Stephen A. Mayo, The Palestinian Legal Study: Con-
sensus and Assessment of the New Palestinian Legal System, 38 HARv. INT'L L.J. 375,
401-11 (1997) (discussing problems confronting the reform of the Palestinian civil
justice system). Concerns about the Palestinian judiciary also appear in the criminal
justice context. See id. at 411-25; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 58, at 27-30
(discussing the disempowerment of the judiciary in criminal cases).
124 See WORLD BANK GUIDELINES, art. M]I.6(1), supra note 80, at 159 (providing for
free transferability of financial resources); MODEL UNITED STATES BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATY, art. V, reprinted in Lewis, supra note 87, at 140 (providing for
free transferability and laying out legal areas under which transfer may be prevented);
GERMAN INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 87, art. 5 (providing for free transferability
of financial resources); NAFTA, supra note 87, arts. 1109(1), 1109(4) (providing for
free transferability of financial resources and laying out legal areas under which such
transfers may be prevented); MAI, supra note 81, § IV, arts. 4.1, 4.6 (providing for
free transferability and areas which would prevent transfers).
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transfer in a convertible currency acceptable to the Investor."'"5 Article
12 allows the PNA to limit repatriation in applying bankruptcy, securi-
ties, criminal, tax, and currency transfer laws as well as enforcing in-
junctions and final judgments of Palestinian courts or arbitral proceed-
ings." The only thing missing from these provisions of the Revised In-
vestment Law that appears in international agreements and guidelines is
the principle of non-discrimination in the application of the public laws
that might limit repatriation."v In addition, the Revised Investment Law
does not guarantee investors access to foreign currencies. This is impor-
tant for foreign investors to conduct business in different jurisdictions as
well as to repatriate financial resources.
5. Summary on General Guarantees
The Revised Investment Law is disappointing because it raises
questions and concerns in connection with the principle of non-
discrimination generally and specifically with regards to expropriation.
The confusing scope of Article 7(A) will worry foreign investors. In ad-
dition, non-discrimination does not appear as a discipline on the power to
expropriate, even though international standards apply this discipline.
The absence of guarantees for prompt and fully realizable compensation
for expropriation in the Revised Investment Law will also concern for-
eign investors because such absence cuts against international standards.
The lack of criteria to regulate unilateral termination of contracts for
non-commercial reasons form another point of possible worry for foreign
investors. Finally, the provision on real property permits contains ambi-
guity as to its protective scope and limits the recourse of an investor for
compensation to Palestinian courts. While the protections for repatria-
tion of financial resources are improved over what appeared in the
Original Investment Law, the PNA's refusal to adopt fully and clearly
international standards on non-discrimination, standards for expropria-
tion, and unilateral termination of contracts for non-commercial reasons
undermines the potential of the Revised Investment Law to contribute to
the legal enabling environment for private sector investment.
125 REVISED PALESTINIAN INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 5, art. 11.
'" Id. art. 12.
127 See, e.g., MODEL UNITED STATES BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, art. V(4), re-
printed in Lewis, supra note 87, at 141 (requiring "the equitable, non-discriminatory
and good faith application of its laws" limiting repatriation); NAFTA, supra note 87,
art. 1109(4) (providing for limits on repatriation); MAI, supra note 81, § IV, art. 4.6
(limiting repatriation).
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C. Institutional Arrangements
Chapter Three of the Revised Investment Law establishes the
Agency and lays out the details of its composition, functions, and pow-
ers. The Agency "shall be an autonomous institution of the Authority," is
governed by a Board of Directors, and operated under the direction of a
Director General."
1. Functions and Powers of the Agency
The basic function of the Agency is to encourage and promote in-
vestment in the Palestinian Territories.'2 Thus, the Board of Directors'
functions include a number of responsibilities connected with attracting
and facilitating investment in the Palestinian Territories."' The Revised
Investment Law instructs the Board of Directors to make the Agency "a
one-stop shop to facilitate all procedures for the Investor concerning the
[i]nvestment."'1' In the context of conducting business in the Palestinian
Territories, the Agency must act as a facilitator of investment, as envi-
sioned in the Revised Investment Law.
While promotional and facilitative functions are important, foreign
investors will be more concerned about the regulatory functions and
powers of the Agency. The Original Investment Law contained signifi-
cant regulatory powers for the Agency, including the power to approve
all investments and grant and cancel tax exemptions." A major weak-
ness of the Original Investment Law was the lack of criteria and stan-
dards to guide the use of Agency regulatory powers. Thus, the Original
Investment Law suffered from a lack of transparency in connection with
the exercise of Agency regulatory powers. In addition, the Original In-
vestment Law granted regulatory powers to political bodies, again mak-
128 REVISED PALESTINIAN INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 5, arts. 8 (establishing the
Palestinian Investment Promotion Agency), 15 (establishing the Agency's Board of
Directors), and 18 (establishing the Agency's Director General).
'29 Id. art. 3(A).
130 See, e.g., id. arts. 16(1) ("Oversee and evaluate policies"), 16(3) ("Attract In-
vestors to Palestine"), 16(4) ("Advise the [PNA] on Palestinian investment policies"),
16(13) ("Develop a close working relationship with the concerned Palestinian au-
thorities to assure a unified national investment promotion strategy"), 16(16) ("Issue
an annual guide for investment opportunities in Palestine").
131 Id. art. 16(18).
132 See, e.g., LAW ON THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF INVESTMENT (1995) (Palestine), art.
11(1), translated in Fidler, supra note 6, app. at 606 (powers to approve investments
and granting tax exemptions); id. art. 19(1), translated in Fidler, supra note 6, app.
at 609 (power to cancel or suspend exemptions under certain conditions).
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ing the operation of the Law less than transparent. 33 Because the Re-
vised Investment Law retains a system of granting tax exemptions and
incentives, the Agency has regulatory powers. These regulatory func-
tions will be examined below in the section on investment incentives. 134
An important Agency function that connects to the creation of an
enabling environment for private sector investment is its role in (1) mod-
ernizing and implementing Palestinian law and international agreements,
and (2) ensuring the Agency operates in an effective and transparent
manner. The Agency is charged with monitoring Palestinian law and pro-
posing changes to the Council of Ministers with respect to laws or
regulations that "restrict, limit, or prejudice any of the rights and guar-
antees provided in the Investment Law."'"3 The Agency must also "[1]ook
into developing and modernizing laws related to investment and adopt
policies and programs that contribute to providing an environment con-
ducive to investment."'3 The Agency has to assist the PNA "in comply-
ing with any investment agreement that the Authority may enter into with
another State or international organization."' 37 This responsibility would
include implementing the agreement between the PNA and the World
Bank concerning the Investment Guarantee Fund, administered by the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and established to "provide
guarantees in the form of insurance against political risk for private in-
vestments in the WBG.' ' 3
The Agency also has responsibilities to ensure that it operates trans-
parently. Article 21 provides, for example, that the Agency shall appoint
independent auditors who have the right to examine all Agency financial
records in conducting audits for the Board of Directors.' 39 The Board of
Directors must also prepare an annual report on the Agency's activities
that includes the audited financial statements.Y Agency staff will be
'3 See id. art. 14, translated in Fidler, supra note 6, app. at 608 (making invest-
ment in six economic sectors subject to prior approval by the PNA); id. art. 19(3),
translated in Fidler, supra note 6, app. at 609 (giving President of PNA the power to
resolve exemption cancellation disputes between the PNA and investors); Fidler, su-
pra note 6, at 567-68, 572 (criticizing Articles 14 and 19).
'34 See infra Part II.D.
135 REVISED PALESTINIAN INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 5, art. 16(11).
'3 Id. art. 16(15).
'37 Id. art. 16(12).
138 World Bank, supra note 55 (describing Investment Guarantee Fund).
139 See REVISED PALESTINIAN INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 5, art. 21.
140 See id. art. 16(14). As with the Original Investment Law, these provisions could
have been strengthened by requiring the Agency's financial statements to be audited
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will be subject to procedures adopted from the Palestinian Civil Servants
Law.' 4' The Agency is also required to protect all confidential informa-
tion provided to it by investors."
2. Structure and Procedures of the Agency
A major concern with the Original Investment Law's Agency provi-
sions was that they made the Agency vulnerable to PNA politics because
of the dominance of PNA ministries on the Board of Directors and the
presence of Board members hand-picked by Arafat. 43 PNA ministry rep-
resentatives still dominate the Agency, accounting for eight of the thir-
teen seats on the Board of Directors. 44 Five representatives from the pri-
vate sector will be appointed by the PNA Council of Ministers, upon the
recommendation of the Board of Directors." Given the way Arafat
dominates the PNA, the Revised Investment Law gives little comfort that
it will not be subject to PNA politics. The effect of possible politiciza-
tion on the Agency depends, however, on the extent of its regulatory
powers. The significant regulatory powers of the Agency under the
Original Investment Law were a cause of deep concern. If the Agency is
now more promotional than regulatory, potential political influence on
its operations will concern investors less than politics affecting regula-
tory action. I return to this point in examining the incentives in the Re-
vised Investment Law.
The almost identical structure of the Agency's Board of Directors in
the Original and Revised Investment Laws means that the Revised In-
vestment Law repeats other problems seen in the Original Investment
Law. As I argued in connection with the Original Investment Law:
With the interests of so many ministries represented in the delibera-
tions of the Board of Directors, its decision-making process will not
be transparent or predictable. The dynamics of the Board of Directors
may be such that only forceful direction from the President of the
PNA will produce decisions. In such a situation, the real power re-
according to generally accepted public sector accounting principles. See Fidler, supra
note 6, at 560 (noting possible need for auditing under internationally recognized
accounting principles).
41 See id. art. 16(19).
1' See id. arts. 1, 22 (providing a comprehensive definition of confidential infor-
mation with protection that should appeal to investors).
143 See Fidler, supra note 6, at 560.
144 See REVISED PALESTINIAN INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 5, art. 15.
" See id. art. 15(3).
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sides not in the Investment Agency but in the President's office,
opening up even greater potential for politicized decision-making. 46
To underscore this concern, mention should be made of Article
17(D), which provides that the "deliberations of the Board shall be
closed, unless the members agree otherwise."'47 Thus, the process by
which the Board of Directors makes decisions will not be transparent,
further distancing the Revised Investment Law from the important prin-
ciple of transparency. Positively, the Revised Investment Law requires
that the private sector Board representatives and the Director General act
without conflicts of interest in connection with investments under the
Agency's jurisdiction. 4
The Revised Investment Law provides that Board of Directors' de-
cisions are made by majority vote, with the Chairman's vote breaking the
tie."'4 The Agency will be funded by regular appropriations from the
PNA budget,"I° as well as (1) revenues generated by the Agency's provi-
sion of services to Investors; (2) stamp duties paid in the investment
process; (3) penalties imposed under the Law; and (4) grants from gov-
ernments, international organizations, and non-governmental organiza-
tions. 5' Most troubling from a foreign investor's point of view are the
funding mechanisms involving stamp duties and penalties. While the Re-
vised Investment Law deals with the penalties in the provisions on incen-
tives (see analysis below), it does not define what "stamp duties paid in
the investment process" are - which makes this a provision the Agency
will have to make clear to investors.
D. Exemptions and Incentives
Countries often attempt to attract foreign investment with various
tax exemptions and incentives. International standards do not require the
offering of such tax benefits. International standards prohibit govern-
ments from requiring investors to (1) purchase or use products of domes-
tic origin, (2) limit the volume of imported products, and (3) export a
certain level of products containing local parts and components in order
146 Fidler, supra note 6, at 561.
147 REVISED PALESTINIAN INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 5, art. 17(D).
'a See id.
See id. art. 17(C). A quorum of one-third of the membership is required. See id.
art. 17(A). Note also that the Minster of Economy and Trade is the Chairman of the
Board of Directors. See id. art. 15(I).
150 See id. art. 20.
'1' See id. art. 19.
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for the investor to receive certain benefits. 52 The World Bank's experi-
ence with investment laws is that "lower effective tax rates are by far
more attractive to investment than high tax rates plus incentives."'53 De-
spite the World Bank's skepticism about tax incentives in investment
laws, the Revised Investment Law contains a complicated tax exemption
and incentive scheme.'54 This section analyzes critically this complex in-
centive regime.
1. Investment Approval vs. Investment Incentives
The Original Investment Law appeared to require that the Agency
not only deal with applications for tax exemptions but also approve in-
vestments as a general matter.55 This aspect of the Original Investment
Law was criticized by experts." The Revised Investment Law estab-
lishes the principle of free admission, except for investments in the eco-
nomic industries listed in Article 5, which require pre-approval by the
PNA. So investors not investing in Article 5 industries, and who are not
interested in tax exemptions or incentives, do not have to seek investment
approval from the Agency. This is a positive development from the
Original Investment Law because it reduces the scope of the Agency's
regulatory powers. The Agency retains regulatory power in connection
with granting and canceling tax exemptions and incentives which are the
focus of the following sections.
152 See, e.g.,TRIMS, supra note 91, annex (1).
153 The Legal Framework for Business in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, supra note
50, 10 (comment of Joseph Battat of the World Bank); see WORLD BANK
GUIDELINES, art. M.9, supra note 80, at 160-61 (stating that the World Bank Guide-
lines do not require States to provide fiscal incentives to foreign investors, and that
"[r]easonable and stable tax rates are deemed to provide a better incentive than ex-
emptions followed by uncertain or excessive rates").
154 The Original Investment Law also contained complicated tax exemption provi-
sions. See Fidler, supra note 6, at 562-69 (analyzing tax exemption provisions).
155 LAW ON THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF INVESTMENT (1995) (Palestine), art. 11(1),
translated in Fidler, supra note 6, app. at 606 (mentioning "[p]rojects which are ap-
proved by the Agency" being granted exemptions).
15 See The Legal Framework for Business in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, supra
note 50, 10 (describing the comment of World Bank's Joseph Battat "that the
requirement that almost every single investment project needs ... to be approved is
too restrictive"); Fidler, supra note 6, at 558 ("What is not clear from the text is
whether all foreign investors must submit investment projects for review by the In-
vestment Agency or only those seeking the exemption benefits provided by the In-
vestment Law...").
327
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
2. Basic Structure of the Tax Incentive Regime
In both the Original and Revised Investment Laws, the tax incentive
regimes center on exemptions from customs duties and income tax. In the
Original Investment Law, the exemptions from customs duties and in-
come tax corresponded to the size of the investment; how many workers
it employed; and its economic life. Thus, an investment of more than
U.S.$500,000 that employed at least twenty-five Palestinian workers
with a project life of at least ten years was exempt from customs duties
and income tax for five years. 57 This approach created all kinds of diffi-
culties. 58 The Revised Investment Law separates custom duties exemp-
tions from income tax incentives, creating two tax benefit regimes in-
stead of one.'59 In addition, the Revised Investment Law gives the Agency
discretionary power to grant additional exemptions under certain situa-
tions."6° The following sections of this Article critically analyze these
various incentive regimes.
3. Exemptions from Customs Duties
Articles 23 and 36 of the Revised Investment Law lay out the re-
gime concerning exemptions from customs duties.'' Table 1 below sum-
marizes these custom duty exemptions.
TABLE 1: EXEMPTIONS FROM CUSTOMS DUTIES
Category Tax Exemption Criteria
Imported Exemption from customs duties for Agency approval of list of
fixed assets period set by Agency; extension of imported fixed assets
(Art. 23(A)) period possible if nature and size
of investment require extension
Spare parts Exemption from customs duties for (1) Agency approval of
(Art. 23(B)) period set by Agency; no extension list and quantity of spare
option provided parts; and (2) value of
157 LAW ON THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF INVESTMENT (1995) (Palestine), art. 11(1),
translated in Fidler, supra note 6, app. at 606; see Fidler, supra note 6, at 562 (sum-
marizing in a chart the exemption criteria of the Original Investment Law).
158 See Fidler, supra note 6, at 563-64 (analyzing problems with Article 11 of the
Original Investment Law).
159 See REVISED PALESTINIAN INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 5, arts. 23, 24.
160 See id. arts. 24(D), 25(C), 25(D), 32 (creating discretionary power regarding
exceptions and incentives).
161 See id. arts. 23, 36.
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spare parts does not ex-
ceed 15% of fixed assets
Imported Exemption from Agency determination
fixed assets customs duties that fixed assets in-






Price increase Exemption from Price increase must result
in value of customs duties from rise in prices in
fixed assets country of origin, or as a
(Art. 23(D)) result of increase in cost
of shipping or price of
transportation
Furniture Exemption from customs duties; Must be imported for use
(Art. 36(A)) additional exemptions available in hotels; additional ex-
once every seven years for furni- emptions subject to re-
ture purchased for modernization quirements that Agency
and renovation approve list of furniture
to be imported and that
furniture is used within
two years from date list
approved
Electrical Exemption from customs duties; Must be imported for
appliances additional exemptions available tourism or hospital enter-
and electron- once every seven years for items prises; additional exemp-
ics (Arts. purchased for modernization and tions subject to require-
36(B)-(D)) renovation ments that Agency ap-
prove list of electrical
appliances and electron-
ics to be imported and
that are used within two
years from date list ap-
proved
An initial observation about the customs duties exemptions is that
the scope of the term "Investment" affects the application of these ex-
emptions. As the imports that can benefit from the exemptions must re-
late to Investments, the interpretation of Investments will affect the
scope of the customs duties exemptions.
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From the foreign investor's perspective, the first concern about this
regime for customs duties exemptions is whether the PNA can deliver
such exemptions. Under the Economic Protocol, Palestinian import du-
ties are pegged to Israeli tariffs, except in specific circumstances or in
connection to specific products. The Economic Protocol does not give
the PNA general powers to offer duty-free treatment to all kinds of im-
ported products that may be used in Investments. As Molkner argued,
the PNA cannot offer other States reduced tariff rates because the Eco-
nomic Protocol generally applies Israeli tariffs to Palestinian imports.' 2
The Israeli concern about cheaply imported products leaking into the
Israeli market from the Palestinian Territories applies to the customs
duties exemption scheme in the Revised Investment Law. It is, therefore,
unlikely that Israel will be cooperative in effecting this scheme.
The need for Israeli customs cooperation raises a more practical
problem: because Palestinian companies still rely almost exclusively on
the Israeli trade infrastructure to import and export products, the cus-
toms duties exemptions are hostage to Israeli behavior. If border clo-
sures and other Israeli obstructionist tactics remain part of the Palestin-
ian economic reality, then Palestinian importers are likely to continue
having imports marked as destined for Israel rather than the Palestinian
Territories. Marked as such, the imports would receive no customs duty
exemptions. Only independent Palestinian ports and airports would allow
Palestinian companies to import without concern about Israeli actions. 3
The problem is, however, that even with the existence of such a trade
infrastructure, Palestinian import duties are still pegged to Israeli tariffs
under the Economic Protocol until a final settlement is reached.
Leaving aside these legal and political problems, the customs duties
exemption scheme contains many features that would concern foreign
investors. First, the Revised Investment Law sets up a complicated, bu-
reaucratic process that a company has to navigate in order to get fixed
asset imports exempt from customs duties. All the exemptions available
in Article 23, for example, are subject to Agency approvals and deci-
sions. Article 23(A) provides that the Agency has to approve "the list of
fixed assets of the Enterprise" to be imported. 164 No where does the Re-
162 See Molkner, supra note 37, at 1448.
163 In the Wye Memorandum, Israel and the Palestinians committed themselves to
making progress on the construction and operation of a Palestinian seaport in the
Gaza Strip because of "the great importance of the Port of Gaza for the development
of the Palestinian economy, and the expansion of Palestinian trade." Wye River
Memorandum, supra note 1, art. 111.4. The two sides also concluded a protocol on the
establishment and operation of an international airport in the Gaza Strip. Id. art. 111.2.
164 REVISED PALESTINIAN INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 5, art. 23(A).
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vised Investment Law explain the procedure for getting lists of fixed as-
set imports approved. Moreover, it does not provide that such procedure
shall be provided in the Regulations.
Second, the Revised Investment Law does not provide for any crite-
ria to regulate the Agency's approvals or decisions in connection with
customs duty exemptions. The Agency has the power to approve lists of
fixed asset imports,"a set the period in which the approved goods must
be imported," extend exemptions," and determine whether enlargements
increase the productive capacity of the Investment." Nothing in the Re-
vised Investment Law disciplines the Agency's exercise of these powers,
nor does it state that such disciplines will be found in the Regulations.
Thus, the custom duty exemption regime lacks transparency, which will
worry foreign investors.
Third, the custom duty exemptions for tourism enterprises and hos-
pitals differ from the exemptions in Article 23 because they are not gen-
erally subject to Agency approvals or decisions. Article 36(A) provides,
for example, that "[t]he furniture imported for hotels shall be exempt
from customs duties."'" While fixed asset imports of all other enterprises
are subject to Agency approval of lists and other decisions affecting the
operation of an Investment, hotel Investors face none of these non-
transparent, bureaucratic procedures. In addition, hotel Investors also
get the same preferential treatment for imports of electronic appliances
and other electronic products,70 as do hospital Investors.' While the
PNA is trying to boost tourism as an economic development strategy
(e.g., the Bethlehem 2000 Project), the preferential treatment for hotel
Investors looks like special privileges produced by successful lobbying
on the part of the tourist industry because the tourist industry faces none
of the approval procedures faced by all other industries. While the spe-
cial exemptions for hospitals are understandable in terms of efforts to
16 See id. art. 23(A, B).
'6 See id.
'6 See id. art. 23(A).
'6 See id. art. 23(C).
169 REVISED PALESTINIAN INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 5, art. 36(A). Hospital In-
vestors are not mentioned in Article 36(A), but furniture imports for hospitals are
eligible for "additional exemptions from customs duties at least once every seven
years." Id. art. 36(D).
'70 See id. art. 36(B).
171 See id. art. 36(C).
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improve health in the Palestinian Territories," the customs duties ex-
emptions do not include pharmaceuticals and other non-electronic medi-
cal items important to modem health care systems.
4. Income Tax Incentives
The Revised Investment Law constructs a regime under which En-
terprises in which Investment are made can receive income tax incen-
tives. Table 2 below summarizes these income tax incentives.
TABLE 2: INCOME TAX INCENTIVES
Investment Income Tax Incentive Criteria
Size/Type
Investment (1) Income tax exemp- (1) Investor must submit to
between tion for 5 years from Agency information as provided
U.S. $100,000 and commencement of in Regulations; and
U.S.$ 1,000,000 production, and (2) if Agency does not deny
(Art. 24(A)) (2) payment of 10% confirmation of incentives with
income tax for 8 years 30 days, then Enterprise gets
the incentives
Investment (1) Income tax exemp- (1) Investor must submit to
between tion for 5 years after Agency information as provided
U.S.$ 1,000,000 and commencement of pro- in Regulations; and
U.S.$5,000,000 duction, and (2) if Agency does not deny
(Art. 24(B)) (2) payment of 10% confirmation of incentives with
income tax for 12 years 30 days, then Enterprise gets
the incentives
Investment (1) Income tax exemp- (1) Investor must submit to
exceeding tion for 5 years after Agency information as provided
U.S.$5,000,000 commencement of pro- in Regulations; and
(Art. 24(C)) duction, and (2) if Agency does not deny
(2) payment of 10% confirmation of incentives with
income tax for 16 years 30 days, then Enterprise gets
the incentives
172 See, e.g., The Ministry of Health's Financial Crisis, PALESTINE ECON. PULSE,
Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 6 (reporting on grave problems confronting the Palestinian health
system).
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Enlargements of Payment of 10% income (1) Investor must submit to
Existing tax on enlargements Agency information as provided
Enterprises from date of com- in Regulations;
(Art. 28) mencement of produc- (2) if Agency does not deny
tion of enlargements confirmation of incentives with
30 days, then Enterprise gets
the incentives; and
(3) Board of Directors of En-
terprise must approve enlarge-
ment
The first point to mention about the income tax incentives concerns
the scope of the term "Investment." As discussed earlier, Investment sup-
ports a broad and narrow interpretation in the Revised Investment Law.
If the broad interpretation applies, then a passive equity investment in an
Enterprise can trigger income tax incentives for the entire Enterprise. It
is unlikely that the PNA wanted to include passive equity or debt
expenditures as triggering investments for income tax incentives. The
narrow interpretation of Investment, centering on monetary investments
in fixed capital assets, would appropriately focus the income tax
incentives on those Enterprises increasing or improving productive ca-
pacity. The income tax incentives underscore the need for more clarity in
the scope of the term Investment.
Like the exemptions from customs duties, the income tax incentive
provisions set up a bureaucratic process that is unlikely to appeal to for-
eign investors. Under Articles 26-27, Investors wishing to benefit from
the income tax incentives have to submit information to the Agency (as
provided by the Regulations) and follow a procedure to receive confir-
mation of the income tax incentives from the Incentives Committee (as
specified in the Regulations). 73 Without the benefit of such Regulations,
it is not possible to state whether the procedures for submitting informa-
tion and receiving Agency confirmation are transparent. Positively, Arti-
cle 26 forces the Agency to make its determination whether the Enter-
prise qualifies for tax incentives on the basis of information submitted by
the Investor within thirty days from the date the Investor submits infor-
173 See REVISED PALESTINIAN INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 5, arts. 26, 27. Article 1
defines the Incentives Committee as "the committee of the Board of Directors that
reviews and evaluates Investor requests for Confirmation of Investment pursuant to
this Law" without indicating the membership of this Committee here or elsewhere in
the Palestinian Investment Law. Id. art. 1.
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mation. 74 Agency failure to confirm or deny within such thirty-day pe-
riod means that the Enterprise automatically gets the tax incentives. 75
Foreign investors will, however, want to know whether the Regulations
provide specific and transparent criteria under which the Agency must
review applications for income tax incentives.
The income tax incentive provisions in the Revised Investment Law
make a distinction between Investments in new Enterprises and Invest-
ments in existing Enterprises. Investments in new Enterprises that fall
within the terms of Article 24 apparently trigger the income tax incen-
tives for the entire income of such Enterprises because they are new. For
Investments in existing Enterprises, Article 28 provides that "[a] nominal
10% income tax rate shall be assessed on enlargements of existing En-
terprises" caused by Investments within the scope of Article 24.176 This
provision is ambiguous because it is not clear whether the ten percent
income tax rate applies to all the income of the enlarged Enterprise or
just the portion of the Enterprise's income generated by the enlarging
Investment. The Regulations will have to clarify this important point, but
so clarifying will not be easy if the ten percent income tax rate applies
only to portions of an enlarged Enterprise's income. A formula will have
to be devised and applied, resulting in a possible bureaucratic night-
mare. 177
Article 28 provides a definition for what constitutes an enlargement
of an existing Enterprise. This definition will be the basis for Agency
review of applications for the ten percent income tax rate under Article
28. This definition of enlargement is confusing because it states that
enlargement includes an "increase in stated capital or capital injected to
acquire fixed assets."'78 The inclusion of an "increase in stated capital"
suggests that passive equity investments can trigger income tax incen-
tives for an Enterprise, providing an indication that the broad interpreta-
174 See id. art. 26.
175 See id. This is a significant improvement over the income tax incentives in the
Original Investment Law, under which nothing in the Law "guarantees that when an
investor invests a certain amount of money or employs a certain number of people,
the investment proposal will be approved." Fidler, supra note 6, at 564.
176 REVISED PALESTINIAN INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 5, art. 28.
177 Article 28 implies the need to figure out what portion of an enlarged Enter-
prise's total income is eligible for the 10% tax rate. See id. art. 28. Using the defini-
tion of Investment as a guide, one approach to figuring out the eligible Enterprise
income would be to divide the enlarging Investment by the sum of (1) the enlarging
Investment, and (2) the total value of Enterprise fixed assets before the enlarging
Investment was made. See id. art. 1.
179 Id. art. 28 (emphasis added).
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tion of Investment fully applies to the income tax incentive provisions. 79
Further adding to the confusion is the requirement in the definition of
enlargement that the Investment be "intended to increase the productive
capacity of the Investment be it goods, services, or manufacturing and
increase it from previous levels of imports or for the purposes of a new
line of production or service or activity."'" It is not clear whether the
enlarging Investment must merely be intended to increase productive ca-
pacity or must actually do so. What criteria the Agency will use in
evaluating whether an enlarging Investment is intended to, or actually
increases, productive capacity are not provided by the Revised Invest-
ment Law, nor is there any indication the Regulations will provide such
criteria. Transparency suffers again. The meaning of "and increase it
from previous levels of imports" is not clear. Moreover, it is not clear
why the income tax incentive in Article 28 should be linked at all to
"previous levels of imports."
5. Discretionary Exemptions and Incentives
The Revised Investment Law also contains a number of provisions
that give the PNA, including the Agency, discretionary powers to grant
exemptions, incentives, and preferential treatment. Table 3 below sum-
marizes these discretionary powers. Unfortunately, the Revised Invest-
ment Law repeats the mistake of including these types of discretionary
powers which were criticized for appearing in the Original Investment
Law.'8'
TABLE 3: DISCRETIONARY EXEMPTIONS AND INCENTIVES
Category Exemption or Criteria
Incentive
Any special Invest- (1) Income tax exemption (1) Agency must rec-
ment in type and for 5 years from corn- ommend special Invest-
capital (Art. 24(D)) mencement of production, ment to Council of Min-
and isters, and
(2) payment of 10% income (2) Council of Ministers
tax for 20 additional years must approve
179 See id.
18o Id.
181 See Fidler, supra note 6, at 564-66, 594 (noting problems with broad discretion-
ary powers).





Extension of income tax
exemption period up to a
maximum of 5 additional
years
(1) Agency must rec-
ommend extension to
Council of Ministers,
(2) Council of Ministers
must approve, and
(3) extension depends
on nature and location of
Enterprise, increase in




Any Investment en- Extension of income tax If Agency determines
joying tax exemp- exemption for 2 additional that local input in En-
tions and incentives years terprise's equipment,
(Art. 25(C)) machines, and fixtures
exceeds 60%
Any Investment by Preferential treatment or Granted by PNA
Palestinian national special guarantees or incen-
(Art. 25(D)) tives
Enterprises engaged Additional exemptions for Agency may grant if
in export (Art. 32) not more than three years Enterprise exports 30%
of total output
The biggest problem with these discretionary powers is that they are
not transparent because their exercise is not mandatory. For example, the
Agency is not required to grant additional exemptions to an Enterprise
that exports ninety percent of its total output. In three of the five catego-
ries listed in Table 3 above, the exercise of the discretionary powers in-
volves political bodies - either the Council of Ministers or the PNA. Not
only does the Revised Investment Law repeat the mistakes made in the
Original Investment Law concerning discretionary powers, but it also
creates more categories in which the PNA can exercise discretionary
powers. '"
Other problems plague these discretionary provisions. First, the
confusion surrounding the scope of the term Investment affects the read-
'v2 The Original Investment Law had three areas in which such discretionary pow-
ers could be exercised. See Fidler, supra note 6, at 564-66 (analyzing the three dis-
cretionary areas). As Table 3 points out, the Revised Investment Law creates five
areas in which discretionary powers can be exercised.
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ing of these discretionary provisions. Second, the amount of discretion in
some of the provisions is startling. Article 24(D) allows, for example,
the Council of Ministers to grant, upon Agency recommendation, a five-
year income tax exemption and a twenty-year period of ten percent in-
come tax to an Enterprise in which "[a]ny special Investment in type and
capital" is made.183 The Revised Investment Law provides no criteria to
clarify what kinds or size of Investments might qualify for such tax in-
centives, nor does it state that such criteria will appear in the Regula-
tions. Even when the Revised Investment Law provides some criteria,
much is left to the discretion of the PNA. Article 25(A) provides, for
example, that the Council of Ministers, upon recommendation from the
Agency, may extend tax exemption periods up to a maximum of five
years "depending on the nature and location of the Enterprise, increase in
exports, creation of job opportunities and advancement of develop-
ment." '' These criteria are very general, and do not appear to be in-
tended as an exclusive list that the Council of Ministers has to consider.
Third, the power to grant Palestinian nationals who are Investors
"preferential treatment" or "special guarantees or incentives"'" funda-
mentally violates the national treatment principle, a cornerstone of a non-
discriminatory policy towards private sector development. In addition,
this discretionary authority is disciplined by no criteria other than that it
has to be exercised in favor of Palestinian nationals.
Fourth, Article 25(C) might be a trade-related investment measure
proscribed in TRIMS. TRIMS states that making the purchase or use by
an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from domestic sources in
order to gain an advantage violates the national treatment principle.'8
Article 25(C) requires Enterprises to have over sixty percent local input
in their equipment, machines, and fixtures to qualify for an additional
two-year income tax exemption.'8 Under the international standard set
by TRIMS, Article 25(C) violates the national treatment principle.
Fifth, Article 32 arguably violates the standards set by TRIMS as
well. TRIMS prohibits the use of quantitative restrictions on trade, in-
cluding the exportation of a certain volume of products in order to obtain
an advantage." Article 32 allows the Agency to grant "additional ex-
183 REVISED PALESTINIAN INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 5, art. 24(D).
1 4 Id. art. 25(A).
'" Id. art. 25(D).
186 TRIMS, supra note 91, art. 2, annex (1).
187 See REVISED PALESTINIAN INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 5, art. 25(C).
188 TRIMS, supra note 91, art. 2, annex (1).
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emptions" to export Enterprises provided that they export not less than
thirty percent of their total output."
Sixth, leaving aside provisions that possibly violate international
standards found in TRIMS, Articles 25(C) and 32 are not transparent.
The manner in which the Agency will determine whether an Enterprise
has over sixty percent of its equipment, machines, and fixtures from lo-
cal input is not provided. In terms of the export incentive, the Revised
Investment Law does not detail how the Agency will determine whether
an Enterprise is exporting thirty percent of its total output. Furthermore,
the Revised Investment Law does not state that the criteria for the local
input and export related incentives will be spelled out in the Regulations.
Seventh, the Revised Investment Law does not provide any guidance
on how Investors are to apply for discretionary exemptions or incentives,
and it does not leave the establishment of these procedures to the Regula-
tions. The Agency will play a central role in these discretionary grants,
but an Investor will want to know what information has to be submitted
and how much time the Agency or other PNA body has to make a deci-
sion. The Revised Investment Law contains no guidance on these impor-
tant procedural issues.
6. Modifications of Incentives
The Revised Investment Law contains two provisions that relate to
modifications of incentives granted under the Law. First, Article 25(B)
states that the Council of Ministers may limit the "investment period for
Enterprises operating in the industrial zones, and areas that are remote
or under threat of settlement."'" This provision probably means that the
Council of Ministers has the discretionary power to shorten the period in
which income tax incentives granted under Articles 24 or 28 can be en-
joyed by Investors. Only Investments made in industrial zones, remote
areas, or areas under threat of settlement could have income tax incen-
tives modified by the Council of Ministers under Article 25(B).
Second, Article 34 provides Enterprises enjoying customs duty ex-
emptions or income tax incentives with the choice of keeping existing
exemptions or incentives, or opting to benefit from more favorable ex-
emptions or incentives promulgated by the PNA. 91 This provision pre-
vents the PNA from enacting and then retroactively applying less desir-
able exemptions or incentives against existing Enterprises.
189 REVISED PALESTINIAN INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 5, art. 32.
'90 Id. art. 25(B).
19 Id. art. 34.
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7. Transfers and Incentives
Investors want to have as much freedom to operate their investments
as possible, including freedom to transfer assets or even sell the entire
company. Thus, whether the Revised Investment Law interferes with
such freedom will be an important point for foreign investors. The Origi-
nal Investment Law suffered from very restrictive provisions on the
transfer of assets of an Enterprise enjoying incentives. 92 The Revised
Investment Law allows such an Enterprise to be "transferred freely to a
new owner in its entirety; provided that the new owner continues to op-
erate the Enterprise as a going concern."' 93 The new owner benefits
"from the Incentives as long as the new owner continues to operate the
Enterprise as a going concern."'94 If an Enterprise that enjoys benefits
under the Revised Investment Law is restructured through mergers or
joint ventures, then it continues to enjoy such benefits, but "such restruc-
turing shall not result in any new exemptions from taxation."'9 "
Article 39 addresses sales of fixed assets of Enterprises enjoying
benefits under the Revised Investment Law, and its provisions are con-
fusing and worrying. Article 39 treats sales of fixed assets by an Enter-
prise enjoying benefits restrictively if the sales are made to another En-
terprise that also enjoys benefits under the Revised Investment Law. Ar-
ticle 39(A) provides that the "Investor may sell the fixed assets that are
exempt or assign them to another Investor enjoying the benefits of this
Law provided that the approval of the Agency is obtained."'" The need
for Agency approval of fixed asset sales in this situation is not clear, and
foreign investors will see this as an unnecessary restriction on the free-
dom of business operations. Also, forcing the Agency to vet fixed asset
sales from one Investor to another seems like a bureaucratic waste of
time and resources. Such vetting is not necessary because if an Investor
buys fixed assets from another Investor, the purchase has to meet the
conditions of Articles 24 and 28 to receive income tax incentives.
Article 39(B) does not impose similar restrictions on sales of fixed
assets from an Investor to a company not enjoying exemptions or incen-
19' See The Legal Framework for Business in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, supra
note 50, 10 (describing comments of Joseph Battat of the World Bank on provisions
restricting sale of assets); Fidler, supra note 6, at 569 (analyzing provisions on sale of
assets).
193 REVISED PALESTINIAN INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 5, art. 30(A).
194 Id. art. 30(B).
19' Id. art. 31.
19' Id. art. 39(A).
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tives under the Revised Investment Law.'97 The selling Investor need only
notify the Agency, and the seller and buyer have to pay all relevant sales
taxes and fees. 98 While less restrictive than Article 39(A), it is still not
clear why the Agency hag to be notified of such sales. For example, the
Revised Investment Law does not require Enterprises enjoying benefits
under Article 24 to maintain certain amounts of fixed assets to continue
to receive the same income tax incentives. The notification requirement
suggests that the Agency may have the power to change the benefits an
Enterprise enjoys after fixed asset sales, but the Revised Investment Law
does not provide for such a power explicitly, raising transparency con-
cerns again.
8. Cancellation or Alteration of Exemptions and Incentives
The Revised Investment Law gives the Agency the power to cancel
the exemptions from customs duties and income tax incentives when (1)
the Investor knowingly supplied the Agency with false information that
was material to the Agency decision in question, or withheld material
information from the Agency;' (2) the Enterprise enjoying benefits sells
or uses "exempt fixed assets.., for an unauthorized purpose;"00 and (3)
the Investor otherwise commits fraud on the Agency.2"1 Of these three
grounds for cancellation, the most ambiguous is the punishment for sell-
ing or using "exempt fixed assets ... for an unauthorized purpose." The
exact meaning of this provision is unclear, thereby creating a transpar-
ency problem. Perhaps it simply means for an "illegal purpose," as in
importing machinery ostensibly to make furniture that is used to make
bombs or other weapons. More precision is needed to clarify the concept
of "unauthorized purpose," which could perhaps be provided in the
Regulations.
Another concern with the cancellation provisions is that only Article
33(A) states that the procedure for canceling benefits shall be specified
in the Regulations.m In addition, Article 33(C) states that an Investor
may appeal a cancellation decision "under the procedures specified in the
'97 See id. art. 39(B).
198 See PALESTINIAN INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 5, art. 39(B).
'99 Id. art. 33(A).
200 Id. art. 37. Article 37 does not actually provide for cancellation of benefits; it
requires the Enterprise to pay all customs duties and taxes owed, but it is implicit in
Article 37 that the benefits are, therefore, cancelled.
2' Id. art. 42.
202 Id. art. 33(A).
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Regulations." 23 Article 16(17) also provides for an Investor right to ap-
peal cancellation decisions.' Such cancellation and appeal procedures
are important for due process and transparency reasons. Neither Article
37 nor Article 42, however, contain references that the Regulations will
provide procedural safeguards in the event of cancellation of benefits
under these articles. Article 42 states that the Agency may at any time
"immediately terminate all approvals granted to the Enterprise." Per-
haps Article 16(17) applies to all incentive termination provisions in the
Revised Investment Law; but, as drafted, the ambiguity on this point
would worry foreign investors. All cancellation powers of the PNA
should be subject to transparent procedural requirements, and the Inves-
tor should in all cases have recourse to appeal cancellation decisions.
Article 45 of the Revised Investment Law contains penalties that
apply to Investors that knowingly supply false information to the PNA in
connection with Investments. Such Investors will be fined not less that
2000 Jordanian dinars, and "all exemptions and incentives shall be retro-
actively withdrawn." Thus, depending on how long or how extensively
the Investor's Enterprise enjoyed exemptions from customs duties or in-
come tax incentives, the financial penalties could be enormous when
payments of back customs duties and income taxes are considered. Such
retroactive penalties make having a transparent and fair cancellation
process for all cancellation provisions in the Revised Investment Law
imperative from the investor's perspective.
E. Dispute Settlement
A great weakness of the Original Investment Law was its dispute
settlement provisions. Cancellation of incentives could only be appealed
to the President of the PNA, an overtly political decision maker. 7 In ad-
dition, the Original Investment Law provided foreign investors with no
recourse to international arbitration of disputes with the PNA.28 Making
203 PALESTINIAN INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 5, art. 33(C).
204 See id. art. 16(17).
20' Id. art. 42.
20 Id. art. 45.
2 See LAW ON ENCOURAGEMENT OF INVESTMENT (1995) (Palestine), art. 19(3),
translated in Fidler. supra note 6, at 609. See The Legal Framework for Business in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, supra note 50, [ 10 (stating that Joseph Battat of the
World Bank criticized this aspect); Fidler, supra note 6, at 573 (criticizing Article
19.3 of Original Investment Law).
20a LAW ON THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF INVESTMENT (1995) (Palestine), art. 20, trans-
lated in Fidler, supra note 6, app. at 609-10. See The Legal Framework for Business
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international arbitration an option for foreign investors is an interna-
tional standard for the protection of foreign investment.' The Revised
Investment Law follows this standard by providing that, in a dispute be-
tween an Investor and the PNA that relates "to rights and obligations
provided for in the Investment Law, ''210 "either party shall have the right
to take the dispute to: ... binding, independent arbitration as provided in
the Regulations. '211 What the Regulations make available to investors
will, of course, be critical to the PNA making the right to international
arbitration an effective right. The Regulations will have to provide for
what happens if the PNA wants Palestinian courts to deal with the dis-
pute, but the Investor prefers arbitration. International standards favor
allowing the Investor's choice to govern, but what the Regulations will
propose is still unclear.
While the dispute settlement provisions of the Revised Investment
Law are a significant improvement over the provisions in the Original
Investment Law, serious concerns still exist. A narrow definition of In-
vestment would mean that many types of investments would not, accord-
ing to Article 40 of the Revised Investment Law, "relate to rights and
obligations provided for in the Investment Law." Similarly, a narrow
application of the non-discrimination principle would mean that a dis-
criminatory expropriation would not violate rights and obligations under
the Revised Investment Law. The scope of the dispute settlement provi-
sions only extend as far as the rights and obligations provided for in the
Revised Investment Law, and this should be a source of concern for for-
eign investors.
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, supra note 50, T 10 (stating that Joseph Battat of
the World Bank criticized the lack of international arbitration in the Original Invest-
ment Law); Fidler, supra note 6, at 573 (discussing lack of international arbitration
option in Original Investment Law).
209 See WORLD BANK GUIDELINES, art. V(1), supra note 80, at 164 (dispute settle-
ment mechanisms include "binding independent arbitration"); MODEL UNITED STATES
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, art. IX, reprinted in Lewis, supra note 87, at 143
(providing for international arbitration at the option of the investor); GERMAN
INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 87, art. 10(2) (allowing international arbitration at
request of either party); NAFTA, supra note 87, art. 1120 (providing for investor
submission of claim to arbitration); MAI, supra note 81, § V.D, art. 2 (c) (allowing
investor to choose to settle the dispute by arbitration).
210 REVISED PALESTINIAN INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 5, art. 40.
211 Id. art. 41(B)(1).
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IV. INTERPRETING A DISAPPOINTING REviSION
Part III's analysis of the Revised Investment Law demonstrates that
the PNA's revision of the Original Investment Law is disappointing
when compared to international standards and practices in protecting
foreign investment. While some significant improvements have been
made, as in the dispute settlement context, the failure to make progress
in other areas not only is manifest but also undermines the improvements
made, as suggested by analysis of the dispute settlement provisions. As I
argued in reviewing the Original Investment Law, "[i]t is disturbing that
the Investment Law fails to meet current international standards and
practices, given the desperate need for foreign investment in the Palestin-
ian Territories."2"2 The confusing definition of Investment, the confusing
application of the non-discrimination principle, the failure to adopt fully
international standards on expropriation, the continued presence of broad
discretionary powers, the continued lack of transparency, the continued
involvement of explicitly political bodies in investment decisions, the
continued restrictions on assets sales, and the potentially narrow base for
the improved dispute settlement provisions, and other problems analyzed
above are even more disappointing because they are embedded in the Re-
vised Investment Law after a two-year process of technical advice and
assistance from the World Bank and the United Nations Development
Programme. Incredibly, the Revised Investment Law is in some respects
worse than the Original Investment Law, in that it confuses the scope of
the principle of non-discrimination and the expansion of the areas in
which the PNA can exercise discretionary incentive powers.
The PNA has for the second time rejected many international stan-
dards and practices on foreign investment protection and opted for provi-
sions that will do little to boost foreign investor confidence in the PNA
or the Palestinian Territories as an investment location. As with the
Original Investment Law, creating a modern, effective regime for private
sector investment through the Revised Investment Law "was in the hands
of the Palestinians themselves, and they had an opportunity to demon-
strate to the world that they understood the importance of foreign direct
investment to the achievement of peace and Palestinian autonomy."2 3
Again, the PNA mishandled this opportunity, which may have been its
last in the eyes of many foreign investors.
The disappointing Revised Investment Law raises deeper questions
about the nature of the reform of Palestinian law. Two possible interpre-
tations of the process that produced the Revised Investment Law diverge
212 Fidler, supra note 6, at 594.
213 Fidler, supra note 50, at 23 (commenting on Original Investment Law).
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dramatically and tell very different stories about Palestinian law reform.
The harsh interpretation focuses on the question from a philosophical
angle, while the more lenient stance centers on more pragmatic problems
facing the reform of Palestinian laws.
A. A Rejection of Liberal Thinking?
The philosophically oriented critique of the Revised Investment Law
would argue that the continued refusal of the PNA to adopt clearly and
fully international standards and practices on the protection of foreign
investment suggests that political opposition to these standards and prac-
tices exists. Perhaps the Revised Investment Law reveals within the PNA
deep opposition to the liberal conception of economic development em-
bedded in international standards and practices. Vandevelde argues that
the international investment regime developed largely through bilateral
investment treaties is liberal in nature because this regime, and the recent
shift towards it, is "driven by a perception that private investment would
promote economic development."2 4 The perceived importance of private
investment to Palestinian economic development likewise flows from lib-
eral economic thinking. In fact, the entire Oslo strategy for Palestinian
economic development emerges directly out of liberal philosophy. In ana-
lyzing the Original Investment Law, I wrote:
The case for Palestinian economic development made by the
World Bank and the United States carries with it the assump-
tions and objectives of liberal economic thought. The influence
of liberal economic thinking can be found at four levels. First,
the concern that individual Palestinians need to see that peace
brings prosperity ties into the liberal economic tenet, famously
expressed by Montesquieu, of doux commerce, which holds that
commerce tempers human passions and channels them into pro-
ductive, peaceful endeavors .... Economic development is ex-
pected to dissipate any diseontent among Palestinians, discontent
214 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Sustainable Liberalism and the International Invest-
ment Regime, 19 MICH. J. INT'LL. 373, 390 (1998) [hereinafter Vandevelde, Sustain-
able Liberalism]; see also Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization and
Economic Development: The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 36 CoLuM. J.
TRANSNAT'LL. 501, 506 (1998) (arguing that bilateral investment treaties "contribute
to the construction of a liberal international investment regime") [hereinafter Vande-
velde, Investment Liberalization and Economic Development]; Kenneth J. Vande-
velde, The Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty, 92 AM. J. INT'L L.
621, 621 (1998) (stating that "[tihe massive and sudden proliferation of bilateral in-
vestment treaties ... appears to reflect the triumph of liberal economics in the sphere
of international investment").
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that would otherwise fester and encourage Palestinians to em-
brace the ideas of radicals and extremists opposed to the peace
process. Second, the emphasis in economic development plans on
private investment and market forces demonstrates that the ob-
jective is the creation of a capitalist economy in the Palestinian
Territories . . . .Third, the plans to promote Palestinian eco-
nomic development by integrating Palestinians into regional and
global markets bear the imprint of the liberal belief that eco-
nomic interdependence between peoples and states promotes
peaceful international relations .... Fourth, the liberal economic
theory running throughout the strategy for Palestinian economic
development has consequences for Palestinian political develop-
ment because individual freedoms necessary to make doux com-
merce, the invisible hand, and peace through free trade work will
require substantial political freedoms, like democracy.
215
The political problems with the peace process have wrecked this
tidy liberal vision for the Palestinians, but the Revised Investment Law
may suggest that the PNA does not ascribe to the liberal tenets underly-
ing international standards on foreign investment and the entire Oslo
economic development strategy.
In this respect, the PNA is not different from many governments of
developing countries. Vandevelde observes that, in the area of protecting
foreign investment, "[flew if any developing states have embraced liber-
alization as an end in itself. They are adherents to the liberal faith only
to the extent that the practice of their faith leads to economic salva-
tion."2 6 Guzman's analysis of developing countries as a group rejecting
the liberal standard of compensation for expropriation and developing
countries individually accepting the standard in bilateral investment trea-
ties (BITs) also suggests a lack of commitment by developing States to
liberalism."7 The PNA's reluctance to adopt fully and clearly interna-
tional standards on foreign investment might be analogized to the refusal
by a developing country to sign bilateral investment treaties. Vandevelde
argues that BITs require governments to take certain actions that "are a
partial, but indispensable part, of the liberalization of a state's invest-
ment policy."2 18 He further observes that "[i]f a state is unwilling to
make the commitment to liberalization embodied in a BIT .... then in-
215 Fidler, supra note 6, at 534-35 n.18 (citations omitted).
216 Vandevelde, Sustainable Liberalism, supra note 214, at 390.
217 See generally Guzman, supra note 110.
218 Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization and Economic Development, supra note
214, at 525.
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
vestors may well ask how serious that state's commitment to liberaliza-
tion is."219 The Revised Investment Law invites the same questions about
the seriousness of the PNA's commitment to economic liberalization.
The Revised Investment Law reveals, however, perhaps a deeper
opposition to liberal philosophy in the PNA because it has not fully or
clearly included in its investment law what most developing States ac-
cept in BITs. The history of the Palestinian investment law might make
us wonder about "the propriety of using liberal thought as the foundation
for developing the economy of a people with no history or experience
with free market capitalism or liberal democracy." The politics of the
peace process and the politics of the PNA may have shattered the liberal
vision of Palestinian economic development constructed in the Oslo
process.
B. A Pragmatic Perspective
A more lenient interpretation of the Revised Investment Law rejects
the idea that the PNA is illiberal philosophically and emphasizes the
pragmatic difficulties involved in law reform efforts in new governments
in transition to new forms of politics, economics, and culture. As Tho-
mas Carothers argued in Foreign Affairs, rule-of-law reform efforts in
many regions of the world are experiencing difficulties that need to be
appreciated." The expectations of outsiders for a seamless transition to
modem legal codes and institutions by transition states have not been
fulfilled. Expectations of the same kind for Palestinian law reform are
likewise unrealistic. Indeed, the political and economic obstacles con-
fronting the Palestinian transition to democracy and capitalism are in
many respects more serious than those facing governments of independ-
ent states.
The Revised Investment Law reflects, therefore, not a rejection of
liberal philosophy but another step in the overall process of Palestinian
law reform. The process may, in fact, be more important than the prod-
uct in that the PNA acknowledged criticisms of the Original Investment
Law, engaged in a process of law reform with international organiza-
tions, and promulgated a new law that is, at least in some respects, better
than its predecessor. In addition, the implementation of the Revised In-
vestment Law may well remove confusion and ambiguities now present
in the raw text, so the process of creating a new legal regime for invest-
219 Id. at 526.
220 Fidler, supra note 6, at 535 n.18.
22 See Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1998,
at 95.
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ment is still unfolding. This pragmatic perspective avoids unrealistic ex-
pectations and the mistake of jumping to philosophical conclusions with-
out pausing to consider the historical context or the existing political and
economic realities on the ground. While the Revised Investment Law
may remain in many respects disappointing, comfort and confidence can
be taken by looking pragmatically at the long-term process of investment
law reform that is still unfolding.
V. THE REVISED INVESTMENT LAW, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND THE
PEACE PROCESS
The Revised Investment Law will not significantly improve the
prospects for foreign investment in the Palestinian Territories and, thus,
does not contribute much to the Palestinian economic development. At
the end of the day, however, the provisions in the Palestinian investment
law matter less than other problems menacing the economic future of the
Palestinian people. In Part V, I briefly examine these daunting obstacles
to Palestinian economic development.
A. Whither the Peace Process?
The biggest obstacle to Palestinian economic development is the bit-
ter political conditions of the peace process. While many have wrongly
predicted that the peace process was dead, the process remains in a pre-
carious state despite the achievements in the Wye Memorandum. The
Palestinian Territories continue to be a powder-keg of frustration and
shattered dreams. Rabin's "peace of the brave" has unfortunately be-
come the continuation of hatred and suspicion by other means. As of this
writing, it is not clear that the Wye Memorandum fundamentally altered
the bitter dynamics of the peace process.
While the Wye Memorandum emphasizes the importance of Pales-
tinian economic development, neither this emphasis nor the ideas con-
tained in its economic section are new. Nothing in the Wye Memorandum
suggests that Palestinian economic development now stands on par with
Israeli security concerns in the peace process. The deep involvement of
the United States in the implementation of the security provisions of the
Wye Memorandum might, however, lead to the establishment of more
stable security cooperation that will deteriorate less often into Israeli
border closures and wreak havoc on the Palestinian economy. American-
fostered stabilization of security cooperation might give the Palestinian
economy more breathing room than it has had in the tumultuous years
since 1993.
In the long run, the Palestinians themselves face internal political
problems. The undemocratic leadership of Arafat, the corruption scan-
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dals, and the PNA abuses of human rights have shaken the political self-
confidence of the Palestinians and their optimism about their identity and
future. With no clear political successor, Arafat's health casts a pall
over the peace process and Palestinian autonomy. The deeply entrenched
social and political position of Hamas raises concerns not only about the
impact of this movement on the peace process, but also on the entire fate
of the Palestinian people.
In the past, foreign investors looked at the political instability in the
peace process and adopted a "wait and see" mentality.' Unfortunately,
this mentality has now turned into "let's look somewhere else." With
competition for foreign investment capital intense among developing
countries, foreign investors have plenty of options and do not need to
wait for the peace process to arrive at a stable environment for Palestin-
ian economic developmentY3
B. Whither the Enabling Environment?
Another problem weighing against foreign investment in the Pales-
tinian Territories is the continued difficulties the PNA has in creating a
proper enabling environment for private sector development. The Re-
vised Investment Law is perhaps the classic example of how the PNA
has not done what is considered necessary to reform its law to accommo-
date businesses in the global era. But even if the PNA had adopted a re-
vised law that conformed to all international standards and practices, the
success of this law would remain hostage to the effective reform of Pal-
estinian commercial, trade, and tax laws. The legal reform problems re-
late directly to the political difficulties within the PNA because Arafat's
leadership has not historically operated on the basis of the rule of law.
Those concerned about the fate of the Palestinian people's economic des-
tiny can only hope that the Revised Investment Law proves an aberration
in the legal reforms needed to create the enabling environment for a
globally oriented, market economy.
C. Whither Economic Opportunity for Palestinians?
The economic development strategy forged in the Oslo process and
rekindled in the Wye Memorandum envisioned the Palestinian Territories
as an export platform for major markets around the world. As Part I of
22 Id. at 595.
223 As Gil Feiler put it, "I... wish to make the reader aware of the strong competi-
tion that the Palestinian Authority faces in attracting foreign investment." Reevalu-
ation of the Border Industrial Estates Concept (visited Mar. 5, 1999) <http:Hwww.
ipcri.org/ind.html>.
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this Article observed, many now believe this vision to have, in the words
of the Palestine Economic Pulse, "faded into oblivion." 4 Today, Pales-
tinians believe that the economic situation portends "a future of Palestin-
ian cantons dependent on Israel rather than an independent, territorially
integrated Palestine. ' " Others have more harshly referred to this pros-
pect as the creation of Palestinian Bantustans utterly dependent on Israel
economically.' The continuation and deepening of this economic de-
pendence will not attract foreign investment to the Palestinian Territories
as foreign investors will be wary of the political, social, and economic
consequences of Palestinian economic dependence on Israel.
VI. CONCLUSION
Whether the peace process continues to survive after the Wye
Memorandum, no matter how precariously, remains to be seen. The con-
tinued lack of foreign investment in the Palestinian Territories is not only
a sign of the troubles with the peace process, but it also contributes to
these troubles because foreign investment was considered critical for
Palestinian economic development. Greater political, legal, economic,
and philosophical forces will ultimately control the contribution of the
Revised Investment Law to the peace process and the future of the Pales-
tinian people. As promulgated, however, the Revised Investment Law
represents a questionable contribution to Palestinian economic develop-
ment. Its provisions and the context in which they were adopted fail to
provide what foreign investors will seek before attempting to build and
profit from peace in the Palestinian Territories.
The Paris Protocol Gridlock ... What Next?, supra note 26, at 3.
22 The Palestinian Economy: Keeping People in Their Place, ECONOMIST, Sept. 12-
18, 1998, at 48, 53.
226 See Shlomo Avineri, Sidestepping Democracy, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 1994, at
12, 13 (continued Palestinian economic dependence on Israel would create a "virtual
Bantustan . . . on Israel's doorstep"); see also The Palestinian Economy: Keeping
People in Their Place, supra note 225, at 53 (quoting Azmi Bishara, a Palestinian
member of the Israeli parliament, as saying: "Let's be honest, had Gaza been in
apartheid South Africa it would been called a homeland").

